Am Ende des 18. Jh., als eines der berühmtesten politischen Dokumente, Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte, verabschiedet wurde, war die Antwort auf die Frage nach dem „Was” der Menschenrechte nicht schwer zu finden, obwohl damit Neuland einer grundsätzlich anderen politischen Moral betreten wurde. Auf diese oder andere Weise wurden die Menschenrechte aus der Vernunft abgeleitet, d. h. aus einem Vermögen, welches ein „Evangelium der reinen Vernunft” schreiben sollte. Eineinhalb Jahrhunderte später, im Jahr 1948, war eine solche Antwort nicht nur (...) hindernisreich, sondern es ist in den einigen mageren Jahren des Wirkens der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte klar geworden, dass das Suchen nach dem „Was” der Menschenrechte jeden Tag mehrere und tiefere Unstimmigkeiten zum Vorschein bringt. Deswegen wird eine strategische Verschiebung vorgeschlagen: Erklären wir die Frage nach dem „Was” als überholt und widmen wir uns dem „Wie” der Menschenrechte. Anstatt der positiven Aufgabe, welches Denken auf das „Was” der Menschenrechte antworten kann, schlagen wir eine negative Aufgabe vor: Welches Denken kann dem „Wie” der Menschenrechte schaden? In diesem Beitrag soll gezeigt werden, dass sich durch die Postmoderne das onto-theo-logische Denken eingeschlichen hat, das als eine Linse wirkt, die den Blick auf die Menschenrechte verzerrt und dadurch eine der größten zeitgenössischen Gefahren für die Menschenrechte mit sich bringt. (shrink)

Die Sophisten waren und sind umstritten. In der Zeit des Perikles, der Hochblüte der griechischen Kultur, als Wanderlehrer in Griechenland tätig, bewirkten sie mit ihrer Lehrtätigkeit, welche die verschiedensten Wissensgebiete umfasste, einen grundlegenden Blickwandel: Ihre Befassung mit Erkenntnistheorie, Rhetorik und Politik lenkte den Blick vom Kosmos zurück auf den Menschen. Indem sie den Menschen in den Mittelpunkt ihres Denkens stellten, ja ihn sogar zum Maß aller Dinge erklärten, wendeten sie sich zugleich gegen die traditionelle Sittlichkeit, die in der Regel religiös (...) begründet war. So waren sie für die einen gefeierte Aufklärer, für die anderen jedoch Zerstörer der Tradition. Diese Ambivalenz in der Einschätzung ihres Wirkens ist bis heute geblieben. Was auch geblieben ist und von Moderne wie Postmoderne aufgenommen wurde, sind wesentliche Ansätze ihres Denkens: z. B. ihr erkenntnistheoretischer Relativismus, ihre Vertragstheorie und ihre Lehre vom Recht des Stärkeren. Weil ihr Denken so aktuell ist, untersucht der vorliegende Band nicht nur die antiken Sophisten, sondern vergleicht sie auch mit ihren modernen und postmodernen Wiedergängern wie bspw. Nietzsche, Butler und Foucault. Mit Beiträgen von Viktoria Bachmann, Thomas Buchheim, Bettina Fröhlich, Benjamin Hahn, Hendrik Hansen, Raul Heimann, Johannes Hoerlin, Vanessa Jansche, Christina Kast, Peter Kainz und Barbara Zehnpfennig. (shrink)

Rudolf Bultmann was one of the leading thinkers within an influential theological direction that arose in Europe after the First World War, known as dialectical theology. Comprehensive introductions to the life and work of Bultmann in the South African theological journals, written in Afrikaans, either does not exist, or are difficult to trace for the Afrikaans readership. This article on Bultmann aims to fill the gap by offering a lexicographical contribution on the life and work of Bultmann. The focus of (...) this article is on Bultmann as a Lutheran thinker. The theme of the New Testament and systematic theology is essentially the same, namely to explain the concept of Christian self-understanding as an eschatological event in which faith is expressed for the sake of faith in God and only in God. Bultmann explained the same theological concepts with his theology as those that were explained by the church reformers of the 16th century, but under radically new circumstances. The so-called modern and postmodern people of our time not only broke ties with the past, but in the process they also lost their ability for using historical-critical patterns of thought that tries to bridge historical distances, and therefore sacrificed all efforts to think systematically on the altar of relativism. We can learn from Bultmann what systematic reformed theology really is. (shrink)

Architecture and Deconstruction Case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi -/- Introduction Towards deconstruction in architecture Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore may be described from a greater than before distance. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture, the second one, in which (...) a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced, and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- Peter Eisenman -/- Misreading… and Other Errors -/- The issue of relations between Peter Eisenman’s work and philosophy of deconstruction may be referred to his activity more than ten years preceding his direct collaboration with Jacques Derrida (in 1985) and organisation of the exhibition Deconstructivist Architecture at Museum of Modern Art in New York (in 1988). As soon as at the stage of designing the first houses (House I-III, 1967-1970), which almost entirely inscribed in formalistic aesthetics of Modernism, the architect analysed the problem of architecture dependence on its assumptions. All his later designs may be treated as consequence of this initial interest in relations between practice and theory, and at the same time as an introduction to manipulations later on led at the level of metaphysics of architecture. Beginning with the issue of presence, considered in comments to House VI (1972), the number of ideas having their analogies in philosophy of deconstruction increased. The text entitled The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, The End of the End (1984), in which Eisenman criticised questions of representation in architecture, its delusive strive for truth and comparably unattainable attempts at ultimate definition of elementary rules, should be acclaimed the breaking point. This attitude was extended by numerous strategies disturbing architecture rules defined at metaphysical level in an essay Moving Arrows, Eros, and Other Errors: an Architecture of Absence (1986). The issue of Eisenman’s passage from formalism to deconstruction has already been much discussed in the literature (Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Patin among others), still it should be mentioned that the threads similar to Derrida’s concept included in Eisenman’s writing reveal untranslatability of architecture and philosophy. -/- Choral Works or Separate tricks -/- In 1985-1986 a series of seven disputes between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman took place. The pretext for them were designs concerning Parc de la Villette in Paris. The situation of many months of collaboration between a notable philosopher of the second half of the 20th c. and an architect that already had a huge theoretical oeuvre, ended up with a publication of a large volume entitled Chora L Works and it became at the same time a vast study area for historians of contemporary architecture and philosophers. Derrida’s contribution to concept works were his considerations over the idea of chôra, the properties related to this concept were about to be reflected in shapes of the park. Therefore, Chora L Works became an example of the abilities of contemporary art, both in its capability of translation from philosophical ideas to artistic forms and its resistance to tradition of representing in architecture some phenomena and values originating outside this discipline. In the final period of their collaboration both interlocutors started to polemicise with each other more decidedly, what became a separate part of their thought exchange. The exchange of letters between Derrida and Eisenman at the turn of 1989 ended up the period of their direct contacts, nevertheless, at this time precisely a large group of experts in issues of deconstruction joined the discussion and extended the revealed in the former dispute problems into more than ten years of further considerations and publications. Except for a long text by Jeffrey Kipnis, who had participated in the meetings of the philosopher and the architect, there appeared also comments of researchers of artistic theories (K. Michael Hays, Thomas Patin), philosophers (Andrew Benjamin), and even experts in Greek literature (Maria Theodorou or Ann Bergren). Following these debates a contemporary reflection on architecture has saturated with indeed numerous concepts originating in philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Architecture which imitates mute philosophy -/- The series of Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman meetings, which took place in the period of 1985-1987, induced many authors to make comments. Some of them (Jeffrey Kipnis, Ann Bergren, Maria Theodorou) developed the subject of chôra which was introduced to the discussion by Derrida. The problem that was about to be solved was the question of tying up the concept of chôra with architecture, including Eisenman’s architecture and the series of meetings within frames of Chora L Works project. Kipnis on this occasion paid attention to chôra and its character of anachronia which infects any being created within chôra. In other words any event has its counterpart (analogon) in another, earlier event. He demonstrated the similarity of structure of many events and statements from the times of Derrida and Eisenman’s meetings to the almost identical behaviour of figures in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The loss of beginning present in this phenomenon was appropriate to both features of chôra and the effects of typical analyses of philosophy of deconstruction. Bergren’s analyses focused on accentuating gender of chôra, which, according to this author, had been neglected hitherto in discussions. She collated chôra descriptions with characteristics of women in myths, early Greek epic and philosophy and she arrived at a conclusion that chôra has features of a single woman and a married one at the same time. And yet Theodorou’s studies showed that in the Homeric epics chôra is not treated as an idea but is related with single things and events. The other part of the comments (represented by Andrew Benjamin and K. Michael Hays’ utterances) concerns Eisenman’s attitude to tradition which was treated as a variety of iteration understood philosophically. Benjamin commenced his considerations at the point of closeness between a definition of tradition and a concept of chôra understood as perpetuation (placement). A problematic issue was for him Eisenman’s complex relation to tradition based on its contest and affirmation at the same time. Overcoming the simple subordination to tradition – according to Benjamin – was based on awareness of the role of repetition in culture not known before. Hays made an attempt to explain the pleasure and torment of repetition with the support of Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes’ concepts. According to Hays repetitions are attempts of a single being to a certain primal state perceived as free of any tension. In a similar way Rosalind Krauss explained a motif of a grate present in Modernistic art and also exceptionally frequent in Eisenman’s work. -/- Annex Architecture is still writing Balzac novels. Peter Eisenman and literature -/- Architecture’s approach to writing, script or literature, present within Peter Eisenman’s work, is an exceptional phenomenon, furthermore a complex one. The article considers four possible relations. The first one relates to Eisenman’s characteristics as a person extremely gifted with the ability to wordplay, which very ‘play’ reveals skills to create architectural images. In the second approach the attention has been paid to Eisenman’s interests – in the first period of his oeuvre – in linguistic works by Noam Chomsky and his transformational-generative grammar. The third kind of relations applied to overcoming the need for autonomy of architecture (and of modernist aesthetics at the same time) and renew interests in questions of meaning in architecture. The fourth sort of relations occurred when Eisenman started to create reflections of historic or literary narrations in architecture – ‘stone stories’ and architectural fictions of their kind. -/- Bernard Tschumi -/- From perversion to deconstruction In Bernard Tschumi’s writings from the 1970s and 1980s we can find a transposition of important threads of post-structuralist ideas deriving from Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida’s works. The analysis of the architect’s writings also shows roots in Phillippe Sollers, Michel Foucault and Denis Hollier’s works. The analysis of borrowed elements from the beginnings of Tschumi’s theoretical activity may be helpful in explaining the contents of his later writings motre inspired by philosophy of deconstruction. The set of his earliest views was inspired by Marxism, Neo Marxism and French Structuralism, mainly by the writings of Henri Levebre and Guy Debord. From the thought of Levebre Tschumi took interest for city as not only a question of urbanistics but also a political issue. From Debord’s concepts he borrowed a conviction about the role of situational violation for changes in the society structure. Some of these beliefs were preserved in his own concepts of architecture as an event. From this period derived also his will to change conservative elements of social structure not by means of political revolution but of theoretical and creative activity. Tschumi acknowledged that the effective way of the proceedings towards achieving his aims would be accepting the role of both a critical intellectualist and architecture expert who would not hide away his left-wing orientation. The speculations defined by the architect as ‘revolting analyses’ were about to characterise contradictions which tear the society apart, penetrate architecture and constitute the basis of culture. Spreading away of the conscience of false assumptions hidden away in various disciplines could have weakened cohesion of a conservative society and influence the will to change among the elites. This way the beginnings of political revolution were rooted in philosophy of architecture. In 1977 Tschumi published his text entitled The Pleasure of Architecture inspired by Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text, it also included some concepts derived from Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. First of all the author used Barthes’s concept which made an assumption that literary activity is pervaded by the spirit of resistance towards social rules, and Tschudi transferred this remark onto architecture. From the ideas of Bataille, acquainted via Holier’s work, he derived his belief that two concepts of space, a conceptual one (defined as Pyramid) and a sensual one (defined as Labirynth), not losing their distinct features, they join in the concept of experienced space which exceeds contradictions. The exceeding itself was defined as the basic rule of architecture and it was referred to situations in which architecture not only negates social needs, but also disavows its own tradition. Crossing the borders applies not only to political issues or permanent rules of the very discipline but also interfering with other fields (especially literature and film). The fact that architecture is associated with organising events turned Tschumi’s attention to questions of violence that result from upsetting architectural order of a given building by its users and the one hand, and on the other from forcing the users to specific acts imposed by this very order. The analysis of the concepts used by Tschumi in his early writings indicates that they are close to definitions that would occur in his reflection in the following years influenced by philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Approaching deconstruction Tschumi in his theories developed in the 1980s presumed that the current social world had undergone a deep process of decay, and the reaction against which ought to be based on ordering-up actions, and also preserving the main outline of disintegration of the whole and its elements in the state of conflict. The statements concerning the nature of the contemporary to Tschumi social relations were applied by him to the world of architecture, this led him to coming up with designing strategies that took into consideration the destabilised character of conditions in which works of architecture were created. New ways of conduct invented by Tschumi drew their inspiration from literature and research on literature, psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, structuralism and post structuralism, and eventually also deconstruction philosophy. The proposed methods were opposed by their author both to functionalism continuity trends and postmodern architecture. Tschumi’s proposals contradicted any forms of conservatism or traditionalism in political sphere as well as in reference to tendencies in architecture. They were not simple contradictions of social or architectural rules, they intrude them from the inside, weaken or escalate the already existing incongruities, they move the boundaries between the areas. Revolutionary illusions about the possibility of radical changes were replaced with strategies which completed, tainted or test former rules in the series of formal games of permutation and combination. Quite different from avant-garde formalism Tschumi’s games were not about maintaining the autonomy of a given area, but on the contrary – polluting it with other areas’ influences. Tschumi enjoyed demonstrating illusions of architecture concerning simple relations between form and function, or between form and meaning. Making use of Freud, Lacan and Foucault’s research he introduced a category of “madness” into architecture allowing an observation that the recognised norms are nothing but merely ones of many possible principles of behaviour, and their recognised status resulted from unjustified hindering innovativeness which is crucial for architecture. To reborn architecture’s capability of changing Tschumi also made use of Barthes’s discoveries concerning rules of narration and works by writers who applied in their writing knowledge on linguistics. Making a work’s author unclear by various mechanical transformations of its elements was however apparent only, and formal rigours imposed on the process of designing liberated possibilities difficult to obtain in more traditional creative action. Another mode of acting introduced by Tschumi was combining his work of elements deriving from outside architecture; joining space records with notation of motion and events accompanying architectural objects among others. These architectural and extra-architectural elements were not unified, on the contrary their heterogenous and conflictual character was stressed. This is how shock, anxiety and instability, typical for live in great metropolises, infiltrated architecture. Taking some ideas of deconstruction philosophy as a pattern Tschumi also took into critical consideration in his essays traditional in architecture oppositions between form and figuration, or theory and practice. By combining various inspirations he eventually worked out an idea of architectural event, which he understood as a series of actions contesting its own field, redefining its sources, principles and elements. An event, understood in this way, was not so much producing works as rather creating conditions of their production and at the same time designing the society different from a hierarchic one. -/- Park of deconstruction Among numerous philosophical strategies of deconstruction most frequently used was questioning the practice of strong opposition of two reasons. In many cases Bernard Tschumi’s writings just consider functioning of the conflict juxtaposition of the ideas of structure and ornament or theory and practice in history of architecture. Violation of traditional relations between terms of this kind, both old and modern, raised Jacques Derrida’s objections, when he was induced for the first time to co-operate with architects’ milieu. During this long lasting thought exchange the philosopher eventually acknowledged Bernard Tschumi’s arguments for reasoning the encroachment of architecture’s fundamental rules. Deconstruction applied in architecture was not a simple transposition or analogy of practices that had been applied by philosophy of deconstruction. We may even say that considering architectural terms became an important formula of deconstruction. Architecture understood in philosophical way became something beyond the practice and theory of its own discipline, a sort of metaphysics of both philosophy and architecture. The deliberate encroachment of simplicity of dividing architecture into theory and practice, for the first time became a clear aim for Tschumi in his drawings and texts entitled The Manhattan Transcripts. The contents of this series of works was a record of characteristic features of this New York district in such a way that not only objects were the subject of the record but also relations between objects, people and events. The record was about to take into consideration a conflict character of elements of this representation and at the same time to avoid applying to them the rule of mimetism. The record became a form of reflection over the very record by an increased control over the ways of representation. Architecture which was considered in the The Manhattan Transcripts was not directed to fulfill the needs of inhabitation or production, it was rather related with hitherto usually marginalised liminal situations: building ostentatiously big monuments, religious cult, war etc. Architecture operating in these relations focused also the attention on the included in it continuous tendency to overpass its own restrictions, the role of violence as its not recognised factor, or the meaning of excess and shock in its operation. Architecture moving from reason towards madness became even more visible in the design of Parisian Parc de la Villette, whose pavilions were defined as folies (in French it means both small park buildings and follies). The park was supposed to be on the one hand a reflection of traditional society disintegration while on the other it questioned basic rules of producing a work of architecture. The traditional rules of designing, based on ordering up, were replaced with the strategies of dysfunction and dissociation. In Tschumi’s opinion methods of this kind may be equivalent of what Derrida named différance. Instead of aiming at mergence, any diversity, plays or variations were strengthen. Tschumi’s texts, in which he explained his attitude, were completed by Derrida’s extent statement entitled Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture. Derrida’s article is the most significant of all his statements on architecture as a form of thinking and activity. According to the philosopher, architecture should divide space (in French defined as espacement), what enables both thinking and action – it arranges the space of an event. Tschumi’s buildings, defined as folies, in an essential way destabilise any created order, and at the same time they refresh it. Derrida’s statement suggests that architecture may become both metaphor of an order merging a language or a society but also of inner forces which deconstruct and reconstruct it. Therefore architecture is at the same time a construction, a deconstruction and a reconstruction. Parc de la Villette stands out in this system with its attempt to step beyond the scheme of an easy repetition and its heading for chances of achieving more radical otherness. -/- Conclusion Destruction as construction. Paradoxes of deconstruction in architecture -/- Scepticism about persistence and common importance of fundamental values of human culture evinced in philosophers and writers’ works as early as in Greek antiquity, nevertheless it was not expressed so strongly as in the second half of the 20th century. Especially in Heidegger’s work Being and Time (although originated in 1927, still influential in all later philosophy) the following states were characterised: the state of losing the ground (Abgrund), of being out of sight (Unheimlichkeit) and of being out of dwelling (Un-zuhause-sein) – as the basis of self-confidence of conscious being there (Dasein). The entire criticism of philosophy of home and dwelling draws the inspiration from this early writing of the German philosopher, it combines crisis of basic terms of metaphysics with social conditions which are dictated by living in large metropolis. The crisis of both metaphysical foundation and home appears to be similar to the situation of weakening the relations between a man and his dwelling in extensively expanding cities. Whereas philosophy, as well as many disciplines of social sciences, have diagnosed for a long time the destabilisation of fundamental ideas of Western culture and crucial changes in the ways of dwelling, architecture itself occurred to be “the last fortress of metaphysics” (J. Derrida). Among contemporary architects, Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi were the ones who engaged most decidedly in the issues of critical analysis of architecture foundation and its social role. Both the architects noticed new formulas of contemporary social and individual existence, tremendously different from the entire history, and at the same time they affirmed lack of adequacy of architecture concepts to new situations. Both Eisenman and Tschumi used to describe the existing architecture as a tool for consolidation of highly integrated and hierarchised societies, and also as a discipline extremely uncoincidental with the current character of social life based on ideas of freedom and diversity. The means to transform architecture and make a factor of further social changes out of it, was a concept that accentuated revealing the inner contradictions of this discipline, and considering them in designing strategies. Eisenman’s activity, in regard of what has just been noticed, was focused on questioning the basic rules of traditionally comprehended architecture, especially the rule of purpose. The American architect noticed that the concept of architecture as fulfilment the need of location, hides away the fact that the location has to be constantly reconsidered, and hence it is overtaken by change (dislocation). Therefore new concept of architecture propounded architectural activity to translocate the concept of location – more than before – but also to change its status perpetually. Such comprehended architecture should claim, as its main purpose, the constant revision of this purpose and create itself anew permanently. Even Eisenman’s earliest designs of houses nos. I-IV broke with such values as the sense of safety, closeness and familiarity, and just on the contrary they accentuated senses of strangeness, homelessness and loss of confidence. The contradictions within architecture noticed by Tschumi referred to combination of intellectual and sensual values in architecture, when their non-appropriation was defeated by an additional condition, namely the way of experience based on pleasure of excess, marked by insanity. The features of folly were especially visible in his designs of gardens, where the order of planning was mixed with sensual experience introduced by particular elements (both the ones created by nature, and the buildings defined as folies). Parc de la Villette designed by the French architect in Paris put in question not only the common understanding of purpose in architecture but also the ideas of order and integrity, as its plan was based on the combination of independent layers with records of grids of points, various lines and planes. The architecture that collides inadequate elements with each other was supposed to be a kind of an event with no beginning and no end. The architecture treated as an event became a form of a space weakened articulation that maintains its diversity and lack of accordance of the elements building it up. The analyses of Eisenman and Tschumi’s theoretical writings indicate how much the aims of architecture have actually changed; instead of supporting social persistence, the architecture is rather intensifying contradictions, and instead of providing people with the sense of safety, it sublimes danger. From simple acts of defamiliarisation, increasing the distance to itself and enhancing the role of theory, through discomfort, anxiety, not feeling someone at home, weirdness, excess, shock and violence, architecture reached the edge of stability and uncertainty, only to make an attempt at penetrating what is impossible and unutterable, and recording what cannot become the subject of any records. -/- . (shrink)

This article, based on extensive empirical research and occasioned by the centennial of both the present journal Archiv für Religionspsychologie and its owner, the International Association for the Psychology of Religion, deals extensively with the activities in the psychology of religion of Wilhelm Stählin, the prime force behind the IAPR and founding editor of the AfRp. The article discusses Stählins profound methodological contributions to the literature. It analyses the rather informal “founding” of the IAPR on June 10, 1914 and describes (...) its aims and first activities. Sadly, what had started so promising was destroyed by World War I: the most active members of the board were drafted into the army and had no time left at all for any activities in the field of the psychology of religion. As a consequence of the economic misery in Germany after the war, there was even no paper available to print a next volume of the AfRp until 1921. In the preface to that volume, Stählin articulated his inability to say anything about a possible future of both AfRp and IAPR. Paradoxically, the beginning had become an end, and should only in 1928 be followed by a new start. (shrink)

Der transkulturelle philosophische Dialog bietet einer Kultur, die sich in einer bestimmten Sprache entwickelt hat, die Möglichkeit, ihre Grenzen zu erforschen und sich Wahrheiten gegenüber zu öffnen, die eine andere Kultur ihr bietet. Dem philosophischen Dialog zwischen Franzosen und Deutschen kommt in dieser Hinsicht eine paradigmatische Bedeutung zu. Beide Traditionen formulierten eine radikale Kritik des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Sprache. Sie waren aber gezwungen, ihre Theoriesprachen zu verwenden, ohne auf eine Übereinstimmung mit ihren Gesprächspartnern warten zu können. Der Widerstreit, der daraus (...) entstand, konnte nur eine Lösung finden: die Anerkennung, dass die Logik der Rede und der Schrift die Logik der Wahrheit ist. Anzuerkennen war die Freiheit der philosophischen Urteilskraft des Menschen im Gebrauch der Sprache. Nur so kann man sich von den Pseudo-Gewissheiten des pragmatischen bzw. des konsensuellen Sollen befreien und die ethisch-politischen Sprachwahrheiten anerkennen. Die Neue Moderne hat sich freilich selbst verneint, weil jede Tradition unfähig war, die Falschheit ihrer eigenen pragmatischen Prämissen zu durchschauen. Der Widerstreit der Kulturen kann nur durch die Anerkennung der philosophischen Wahrheitslogik überwunden werden. Die Komplementarität der Wahrheiten kann nutzbar gemacht werden, wenn im transkulturellen Dialog ihr philosophischer Charakter respektiert und die kulturellen Wahrheiten mit Hilfe einer philosophischen Anthropologie beurteilt werden. (shrink)

Was wissen Sie über Kosovo? Nicht genug. Nicht genug jedenfalls über objektive, wertfrei vorgegebene Fakten, mit deren Hilfe man verantwortungsethische Bewertungen des NATO-Angriffs begründen könnte. Trotzdem halte ich drei wertende Aussagen über den Kosovo-Konflikt für vernünftig. Sie lauten (in alphabetischer Reihenfolge): Der bewaffnete Kampf der Albaner im Kosovo war moralisch falsch. Die Militäreinsätze der Serben im Kosovo waren moralisch falsch (schon vor Beginn der NATO-Bombardements und erst recht danach). Und schliesslich: Die Luftschläge des Westens gegen Serbien waren moralisch falsch. Insbesondere (...) diese letzte Behauptung ist der Zielpunkt des Aufsatzes. Mein Plädoyer für diese Behauptung verläuft auf einem dritten Weg zwischen der gesinnungsethischen Position pazifistischer Rigoristen und der verantwortungsethischen Position ihrer Kontrahenten. Die grundlegende Richtlinie für meine Untersuchung besteht darin, keine Behauptungen als objektiv auszugeben, die in Wirklichkeit auf Wertungen beruhen. Schon beim Blick auf die Vorkriegs- und Kriegsgeschehnisse im Kosovo kommen wir nicht ohne die Hilfe von Werten aus; und ich plädiere dafür, diese Geschehnisse im Lichte einer verzweifelten Menschenliebe anzusehen: Daraus ergibt sich eine neue Form von Pazifismus. (shrink)

German Description: Wo bleibt die Aufklarung in Zeiten postmoderner Weite und fundamentalistischer Willkur? Die Autorinnen und Autoren widmen sich dem Thema aus drei Perspektiven: Zum einen untersuchen sie, was Aufklarung wissenschaftstheoretisch bedeuten kann. Zweitens ermitteln sie die Potenziale, die in der Beschaftigung mit der Epoche Aufklarung stecken. Schliesslich analysieren die Beitrage aufklarerische Diskurse. So setzen sich die Texte in der Festschrift fur Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann mit dem aufklarerischen Impetus mittelalterlicher Karten, Hayden Whites oder Michel Foucaults auseinander; sie bieten einen Einblick in (...) die Paradoxien der danischen oder amerikanischen Aufklarung; und sie verweisen auf die aufklarerischen Wurzeln der europaischen Idee, von Volkssouveranitat, Rechtsstaat und Gewaltenteilung, der hygienischen Volkserziehung in der DDR oder der Auseinandersetzung mit Geschichtsrevisionismus und Postmoderne. English Description: Where does the Enlightenment remain in times of postmodern emptiness and fundamentalist caprice? The authors consider this theme from three perspectives: first, they examine what the Enlightenment can mean epistemologically. Second, they look into the potential which arises from an engagement with the Age of Enlightenment. Finally, they analyze the scholarly contributions to the Enlightenment discourse. Thus the texts in the Festschrift for Thomas Stamm-Kuhlmann deal with the Enlightenment impulse of medieval maps between Hayden White and Michel Foucau. (shrink)

continent. 2.2 (2012): 155–158 Michel Serres. Biogea . Trans. Randolph Burks. Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing. 2012. 200 pp. | ISBN 9781937561086 | $22.95 Conveying to potential readers the significance of a book puts me at risk of glad handing. It’s not in my interest to laud the undeserving, especially on the pages of this journal. This is not a sales pitch, but rather an affirmation of a necessary work on very troubled terms: human, earth, nature, and the problematic world we made. (...) It is this world that aspirates the silence (so to speak), and therefore the subject which, along with the development of the “made world” exports the excess augmentation of the cosmically missing, this silence of the natural, et cetera. Had we learned from Locke that lesson of “labor,” to consume what we need… but perhaps we need more than what matters? Serres’ Biogea has several functions on this manner, if it is indeed a book to be consumed. First, readers searching for novelistic entertainment have a place to dwell. Biogea deserves a place in your back pocket; biographical generosity and poetic fluidity should satisfy most textual fetishes. For lay philosophers who want to refresh their acumen, Biogea deserves a place on the book shelf, one already reads a sorely needed postmodern tune-up here. Serres’ style is clearly French; he leaves few cheese crumbs on his words, rather preciseness and breathing in the work give way to a sweeping manner that breaks the narrative line of sight. A circular narrative and anachronistic fragmentation of terms allows an abyssal atmosphere to swell, if only to pump into the book the externality of its broader text. Biogea aspires to a higher standard and the book, at times, is thinking this negentropic problem too. Univocal, the publisher, has crafted a book appropriate for the hands to hold and the translations are an achievement of an otherwise difficult writer to translate. Terms are the conditions of a broader text. It is important to note that Serres’ content is as much a thinking of terminal ports. There is a regard for the transportation technology of the written word. For me, this is the mark of genius, a craftiness that tells of a book device that I may trust. Serres is an accomplished thinker and a necessary voice to check the putative trendiness of anti-postmodernist and market-driven theory of endless cultural liquidation. Offering interventions on subjectivity as an open system we are given a chance to affirm the human, not merely to discard it, but to engage its poetic image emotion, the calibratory silent sense of the analogic world; the terms on which we base our efforts. 1 The human is the center of its own negation, constantly mediating it. Something deeper at stake appears in the work then, and it is quite obvious from the onset. Certainly, a book is an intensification of possible text and those who brought this actual book into existence have captured a rarity in regards to the subject matter and artistic accomplishment. I mentioned terms as conditions, so let us understand Biogea as bio-yea, a yes to bios . An affirmation of living and accepting presence for all of its defiance of images, words, and things temporal. Therefore Serres’ existence and its existants plays parts; out of linearity and still like a porous bone pumping blood it manufactures into the fleshy life it becomes. Starting from a man named silence chaos emerges, or the man “Old Taciturn” takes up a journey anticipating a great flood. In other words, a development akin to the one in Genesis. In dealing with this ancestral occupation, fusing Genesis with contemporary philosophical terms, Serres initiates this anachronistic fragmentation under the forming subjectivity of his own autobiography. This mutation in the open system is precisely one of Serres’ terms. There an abyss is at work, stated, but also measured by heels on the ground—the abyss dispatching earthen tensions, that which plays our tunes, that which we abide by and recognize in volcanoes, rivers, oceans, earthquakes and weaponry in the battles of the world. Set in later stages of the book, such tensions are harnessed through scientific principles in an attempt to unify the terms of natural force if only to terminate the world. Thus the elevation of the earth into the world is clearly set forth. Here already, and few pages in, a resonance is set forth under appellations such as the river Garonne, a subjectivity as much as it is inhuman, the river is the inhuman that makes us human. I get the sense that Serres is taking up a challenge issued by Wallace Stevens; namely, that the great poems of heaven and hell have been written, but that only the poem of the earth has resisted composition. 2 On this level we cannot avoid the killing factor of silence, given that our cognition blocks its pure, radical obliteration. Thus a silence of attunement to the earth is in a novel dialectic of the rithmic and rhythm. A technological world, a triumph of termination is set forth. If a text imposes its will given the reader who authorizes it, it is made to convey or convect a presupposition to a reader or its inhabitant(s). Text is therefore both, in-content, contenting, contentedness, and in reading it, a way to navigate self-destruction (dis-content). Here then would one note that the “inhuman” reveals itself, “an aperiodic rhythm of lovers and beloved…the sea as our friend…but as our enemy…maternal vivifying sea.” The sea is an open book, or vaginal birth canal, where the engagement of text comes forth: “…woman sea, open vulva.” One sees like the sea, but only after it, when the uninhabitable truth of inhabiting it switches the polarity of the sailors soul: “I was seeing like the sea” (9-11). In other words, we are invited to embrace the nonsense of the visible. At this point I am taken to Jean-François Lyotard’s work The Inhuman , specifically the first entry on negentropy that would be congruent with Serres’ thematic. 3 The human being exports, deports, or transplants its relation through text, through the system— and this is its sense or relation to silence, to music. Unaware of Serres’ proximity to this work, the concept of gender interrelation as regards a solar catastrophe runs clear. It would be, on this basis, that Serres references his peers, the other texts that, as mentioned above, are discarded in philosophy today. For students of philosophy what we have here is perhaps a gift, a needed project. If silence and death are at work, there is a political valence to deal with, and here, much like the domain of the text and the dominion of the reader, we confront the world of natural, fluid violence. The anti-postmodernist critique is in part based on a weak idea that the loss of ideology, of a world vision, motivates the “correlationist” project. 4 Serres seems to offer another way to view this when he notes that whereas persons “sometimes kill,” it is clearly “the collective” that “always kills” (17). What is the collective today, if not an organizing function we never see yet acts in its favor in the name of truth? One feels a sense of enigma here, if only to link to what Stevens remarked of communism as a “grubby faith,” providing this applies for capitalism as well, namely any ideology of progress overly interested in absolutes. Here we get the sense that the inhuman, silence, this type of killing, always killing, could not be matched by human-made, political dynamos. Or that if it comes to an equilibrium, a catastrophe is never too far from us to read with our heels. We are left to note that the forces of nature presuppose and permeate political systems, the more these systems obtain force, the more the system takes upon itself the proper name of nature that motivates its dissemination, albeit falsely. This note, that in an age of ecocide and technological captivity (sustainability and transparency) political regimes won’t grow our soul-learning ears any larger than our tongues, stands clear to us. The promise of technological desubjectification is here pushed aside. Regarding politics, Serres illustrates this fact: Where did this corpse come from? Who was it? Who killed it? I don’t know. I won’t try to find out. I refuse to get vengeance for it. And I only see Garonne. For our victims, today, are the rivers, too. Their waters have irrigated my life, enchanted my thought, invigorated my body; I’ve known them to be threatening, untamable, as dangerous as the sea when it rages. Yes, murderous. They decided to control their courses; dams, sometimes senseless, destroying sites and valleys, reduced entire populations to servile displacements; programs for the irrigation of thirsty farmland, often beneficial of course, completed their drying up.(22) Serres enters into his idea concerning the captivity of language from the natural into a world system: For thousands of years, we have been licking things with our tongues, covering and daubing them so as to appropriate things for ourselves. If language boils down to a convention, this convention took place between the speakers without consulting the thing named, become as a result the property of those who covered it in this way with their drawn or voiced productions. Malfeasance analyzes these acts of appropriation. Thus every inert object, every living thing as well, sleeps under the covers of signs, a little in the way that, today, a thousand posters shouting messages and ugly riots of color drown, with their filthy flood, the landscapes, or better, exclude them from perception because the meaning, almost nil, of this false language and these base images forms an irresistible source of attraction to our neurons and eyes. This appropriation covers the world’s beauty with ugliness. (38-39) Technological concealment coming to bear, we begin to get a sense of another commentary on the condition of sensing, driving home the necessity of a text dealing with such subject matter to be what its terms insist. Thus toward new openings: The new opening. As low beneath our feet as you like, the Biogea opens us to another space, high enough for us to be able to acquire a wisdom there, that of redeveloping this same place differently from our fathers, this place that’s still politically cut up by old hatreds, beneath the flood of tears and blood that we call history. Without this soft place, spiritually very old, but newly conceived in this way, without the juridical construction of a common good, opposed to our filthy ownership, I don’t see how our planet, hard, will survive. Hardness that depends on a softness, material belonging that depends on this temporary rented location (51). Serres enters into a summit on the content and the structure of his work. Archimedes is brought in with the concept of three volcanoes. Meaning fire, but as well earth, water, air. For it was Archimedes’ war machines that sought to lift the earth, thus bringing in the question of principles of science: “can a principle be invented while controlling its consequences?” (66-7). May the earth be put in a sentence, terminated by terminology, appellations, gone wild? By means of these element-dominating laws, this old physicist began to tear nature away from the ancient myths; by a strange return, today we’re plunging our successes back into the anxieties and terrors from which that ancient physics was born. Yes, our new history of science and technology is plunging, today, as though in a loop, into the fundamental human myths from which Empedocles’ first laws came. A major progression and a regression on the nether side of the origins. Consequently, the contemporary time requires that we try to return to that unity in which the principles of hate and love are at the same time human, living, inert and global. We will never attain a deontology of our knowledge and actions without thinking the subjective, the objective, the collective, and the cognitive all together simultaneously. Here, hate and love are the result of these four components.(71) Working then on the concept of fire-starting mirrors to the atomic annihilation of the Second War, Serres works into the subjectivity in question on the matter of rhythm—say rithmic— precisely at that point: Knowledge is changing today. The all-political is dying; the monarchy of the sciences said to be hard is coming to a close. The science of the things of the world will have to communicate just as much as the things of the world do, which do it much better than humans do, who don’t always want to do it. Let’s celebrate two changes this morning. The first one strikes a new blow to our narcissism. No, knowledge and the world don’t resemble our analytical enjoyments of refined cutting up, of endless debates and of exclusions full of hate. They, on the contrary, form a bloc and a sum, alliance and alloys. Uniting the fields of knowledge among themselves the way the things are connected among themselves, the second newness puts into place sets united by interlacing, webs and simplexes that combine with the things of the world, themselves combined, the combined knowledge that understands them.(130-1) Biogea closes on its opening flood thematic, approaching the initial telos of Genesis. Here the trees are brought into a position with atmosphere, the opaque abyssal reservoir, the tomb of the sun, sea in the polarity of the earthen heaven and hell. The poem of the earth then is silent but deadly, indeed, as funny as that phrase is, mainly a tomb gas. The meaning of the living and the non-meaning of things converge in the muteness of the world; this meaning and non-meaning plunge there and come out, the ultimate eddy. Mundus patet: through a fissure, through an opening, a fault, a cleft come noises, calls as small as these apertures. I’m listening, attentive, I’m translating, I’m advancing in the scaled-down meaning and science. Mundus patet: should the world open greatly, it will launch me into its silence. The totality remains silent. Knowledge expanded in elation. White origin of meaning, fountain of joy. (198) Final Remarks One test of a review is the long term trajectory the referee thinks the book will have. I see Serres’ text lending greatly into the vision of Biogea . In fact, in the vision of the novel inquiries of Stephen Jay Gould’s work there is something to be thought on the level of the individual and the species; namely, that humanity and its uniqueness is in its deferral, its thinking and naming, a thinking surrounded by silence that filters into everything, that pulls us through the world, the kinetic pulse we recognize, and all of that we cleave away in the base philosophical maxim of difference itself. Unique individuals are spatial creatures: we dwell, and we ought to get good at it. Yet this is an imaginative space that, if you are crazy enough to believe it, de-term-ine the conditions of its own terms. That is why we are not merely creating spaces on the acceleration of time, or so this ignoramus thinks, to accidentally transcend. Imagination already has this insatiable silence that we drink up and fail to manifest. Space is timeless. The imagination itself, shared by humans for themselves, their objects, and the species as a whole, is a non-defined space of relation; a whole human trajectory as part of nature, and part of worlds that are the other side of thinking nature, the consequence of it, at least our attempt to do so. Our survival is based on our deliberation, our caution, our natural deconstructive sense toward this silence that is already part of the song, sung, singing of this century without end. Good books will let us inhabit this space and recognize a form of life. Serres’ text moves toward dwelling, as noted, in masterful and accessible ways. The pitched battles are the falling replays of anemic and dead politics. As soon as we realize there is humanity, we may be able to enjoy the end of it, our inhuman capability of listening to silence. NOTES 1. See Michel Serres. The Parasite . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 2007. 2. Wallace Stevens, “Imagination as Value” [ca. 1945], in Collected Poetry and Prose . New York: The Library of America. 1997. 724-39. 3. Jean-François Lyotard. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time . Trans. Geoffrey Bennington & Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 1992. 4. See the introduction: Quentin Melliassoux. After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency . Trans. Ray Brassier. New York: Continuum. 2008. EDITOR'S NOTE: This review was updated on August 8, 2012. Substantial edits include block quotes from the book under review as well as the inclusion of comments from the author. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Believing in Yesterday while Living for TodayJudith P. HallettLee T. Pearcy's meditation on the past and prospects of classical education in the United States, The Grammar of Our Civility: Classical Education in America (Baylor University Press, Waco, Tex. 2005), embarks from an assessment by the German émigré-scholar Werner Jaeger in his Scripta Minora, published in Rome in 1961, a year before Jaeger died. Jaeger's exact words merit full quotation: (...) "Without the continuing prestige of the ancient idea of humanity in human culture, classical scholarship is just a waste of time. Whoever does not see this ought to come to America and let himself learn from the way classical studies have developed there." Arguing "that Jaeger was right," Pearcy contends that "Classics, the study of ancient Greece and Rome, has never developed, as other academic subjects and disciplines have, a distinctly American form in response to American social and cultural conditions." Instead, "classics in this country has imitated European models and patterned itself after forms of education and scholarship developed in a cultural context where, as Jaeger saw, the prestige of Humanism guaranteed the cultural value of classical study" (Foreword, x).The Grammar of Our Civility not only offers a thoughtful response to Jaeger's criticism of how classical studies have developed in this alien environment; it also considers how they might, at long last, become truly American. In faulting classics in this country for merely emulating inapposite European models, Pearcy investigates the genesis of these models in Renaissance Italy and nineteenth-century England and Germany, and traces the evolution of American classics in higher and secondary education from colonial to contemporary times. He maintains that the inability of classics "to negotiate successfully the transition at the end of the nineteenth century," moving from the curricular configurations that have been called the "Old College" to the modern American university, has left it uniquely marginalized among professionalized disciplines. Yet he also evocatively imagines, in the mode of another illustrious European settler on our shores, John Lennon: "the contours of a distinctive form of classical education grounded in American personal and social reality [End Page 589] as firmly as European classical studies were grounded in the society they served" (Foreword, ix–x).Pearcy insists that this "pragmatic" American form of classical education needs to resemble its European predecessor by remaining "a way of becoming human and humane." Nevertheless, he envisions that it will adopt patterns of education and scholarship that draw on the "progressive, democratic strain" in the practice of a few American classicists, "avoid[ing] the temptations of some postmodern theories that deny language and literature any possibility of interacting with the human world and make them instruments of power rather than the creators of the powerful." He visualizes a discipline that emerges from and reacts to what he terms the "American cultural self... indeterminate and various." At the same time, he stipulates that this new form of classics must respond to "Jaeger's provocative challenge... by refusing to depend on the 'ancient idea of humanity in human culture'" (118–19).Jaeger's "ancient idea," responsible for the form of classical education that prevailed from approximately the Renaissance to World War I, is the "grammar" of Pearcy's title. Pearcy deploys the term "grammar" in an inventive, subtle analogy between the mastery of an individual language and the study of the entire classical world. As he observes, much as those who acquire the fundamentals of a language through exposure to abstract accounts of its workings become capable of comprehending and actively transforming the culture that this language describes and sustains, so those who once absorbed the messages emanating from that old-time, Old World classical education came to possess the "tastes, values and attitudes of the governing class," and be deemed "civilized" (2–5).Pearcy ponders the form that this "civility" of yore—informed, humane interactions of the mind—might assume in American society today. He similarly considers how a new, culturally rooted and authentic kind of grammar—formal intellectual engagement with the ancient Greco-Roman world in the halls of learning—might foster that civility. Not surprisingly, he assumes that those acquiring this grammar "will begin... (shrink)

continent. 2.1 (2012): 22–28. Jeroen Mettes burst onto the Dutch poetry scene twice. First, in 2005, when he became a strong presence on the nascent Dutch poetry blogosphere overnight as he embarked on his critical project Dichtersalfabet (Poet’s Alphabet). And again in 2011, when to great critical acclaim (and some bafflement) his complete writings were published – almost five years after his far too early death. 2005 was the year in which Dutch poetry blogging exploded. That year saw the foundation (...) of the influential, polemical, and populistically inclined weblog De Contrabas (The Double Bass), which became a strong force for internet poetry in Dutch in the years to follow. In the summer of that year, a lively debate raged in the aftermath of Bas Belleman’s article “ Doet poëzie er nu eindelijk toe ?” (“Does poetry finally matter now?”), on a blog specifically devoted to this question. Up to that point, the poetical debate in the Netherlands had largely been confined to literary reviews (which were often subsidized), having become mostly marginalized in more mainstream media, where poetry could be covered by only a small number of so-called authorities. As a result, literary debate had acquired a rather placid quality. Though a variety of camps with different aesthetics could be discerned, most poetical positions shared a general acceptance of poetry as a form of art somewhat apart from fundamental political concerns. Late modernists would pursue subtlety and density of reference. Others would insist poetry was best understood as a form of entertainment that should ideally be accessible and work well on the stage. Still others would insist that poetry is mostly a play with forms. Linguistically disruptive strategies were valued highly by some, but mostly for their aesthetic effect. Values of disinterested playfulness reigned supreme everywhere. Any idea that poetry could be a field in which one confronts politics and the world was decidedly marginal. This led to a climate in which most attempts at polemics were DOA, often based on far too superficial positioning and analysis. The greatest polemical debates were revolving around the question of whether poetry should be difficult or easy, with both camps defining their ideas of difficulty and accessibility in ways that were so utterly shallow as to make the entire point moot. Debates were performed, rather than engaged with. It was a postmodern hell of underarticulated poetics. Half-consciously, people were yearning for new forms of criticism that could put the oomph back into poetry. Weblogs provided for ways to explore debate directly outside of the clotted older channels of the reviews and the newspapers. Belleman’s essay and the resulting online activity had shown that there was a widespread eagerness to take poetry more seriously as a social art form. It was in this environment that Mettes started his remarkable project Dichtersalfabet . At that moment, Mettes was active mostly in academic circles, having become noted at Leiden University as a particularly gifted student of literary theory. Within the Netherlands, the field of literary theory has a very odd relationship to literature as it is practiced in the country. Academic theory tends to have a mostly international view and engage with international debates of cultural criticism, literary theory, and philosophy, with academics often publishing in English and attending conferences around the world. Literature itself however is much more concerned with domestic traditions. Consequently, in the Netherlands, there exists a language gap between academic theoretical practice (as it is studied in the literary theory departments) and literary practice (which, academically, gets studied in specialized departments of Dutch literature). The Dichtersalfabet can be seen as Mettes’s attempt to close this gap. It is also an attempt to bridge the divide between theory and practice, in which he could apply his theoretical knowledge in a very unorthodox and unacademic critical mode that moreover could reach far beyond the domain of conventional criticism. Mettes’s goal was to trace a diagonal through Dutch poetic culture, to “strangle” what he perceived to be its dominant oppressive traditions of agreeable irrelevance, in order to see whatever might be able to survive his critical assaults. But he could only do so by means of a very serious engagement with poetry itself. To this end, he would go systematically through the poetry bookshelf of the Verwijs bookshop (part of a mainstream chain of booksellers) in The Hague, buying one publication per blog item, starting from A and working his way through the alphabet, reading whatever he might encounter that way in the restaurant of the HEMA store (another big commercial chain in the country). He would subsequently write down his reading experiences, refraining however from trying to write a nuanced book review. Rather, he would write about anything that caught his attention and sparked his critical interest. This way of working would yield vast, at times somewhat rambling, dense, lively, and generally brilliant essays, in which he held no punches. He never hesitated to pull out his entire arsenal of concepts from the international theory traditions, while never degenerating into mere academic exercise and pointless intertextualities. The attempt was rather to live the poetry that he read, and to engage it with the full range of political, academic, cultural, and personal references that he had at his disposal—all that composed the individual named Jeroen Mettes as a reader. Often what he wrote would not be according to the standards of what we usually think of as a critical review of a book of poetry. Sometimes he would even be a little sloppy in his judgments of poets or representations of the books he read, for example by basing an entire essay on the blurb of a book rather than its poetry content. But what he did was always brilliant writing nonetheless—virtuoso riffs on poetic fragments randomly found within capitalist society, exposing an incisive and insistent poetical sensibility. Mettes read poetry for political reasons, to see whether poetry could offer him a way to deal with a political world he detested. The right-wing horrors of the Bush years, the Iraq war, and the turn of Dutch public opinion towards ever more conservative, narrow-minded, and xenophobic views alongside a complete failure of the political left to present any credible alternative, were weighing heavily on the times in which Mettes reported on his reading. Poetry was to measure this world, diagram it, to lay bare its inconsistencies and faults, to indicate where lines of flight might be found. Amid the ruins of a world wrecked by imperialist policies, corporate capitalism, and doctrinal neoliberalism it would have to show the possibility of a new community. And it was, through its rhythmical workings, to release the reading subject from his confinement to ideologically conditioned individuality and lead him into the immanent paradise of reading. The stakes were high. Much higher than anything Dutch poetry had seen for many years. Mettes’s blog was widely read from the start. His posts sparked lively debates. Some of these subsequently led to the publication of extensive essays on a few key poets in some literary journals, particularly Parmentier and the Flemish journal yang , for which Mettes would become a member of the editorial board, a few months after starting the Dichtersalfabet . This could have been the start of a brilliant career, but this was not to be. The initial manic energy that fueled the blog gradually subsided. The Alfabet was updated less and less regularly. Mettes sometimes just disappeared for many weeks, then suddenly returning with a brilliant essay. Until, on September 21, 2006, he posted his final blogpost, consisting of no text whatsoever. That night I learned from his mentor at Leiden University that he had committed suicide. Mettes and I had had some fruitful exchanges on poetry, rhythm, music, and form, mostly on the blogs, but also by email. Three weeks before his death was the last time I heard from him: a very sudden, uncharacteristically curt note saying “My old new sentence epic.” Attached to that message I found a DOC-file of a work so major that I felt intimidated. This was N30 , a text he had been working on for over five years. After his death, it took me a long time before I dared to read it in its entirety. In the meantime, the work of preparing the manuscript for publication was entrusted by his relatives to his colleagues at yang magazine. It took them a few years to brush up the text and to edit the Dichtersalfabet -blog (which, apart from the Alphabet project itself, incorporated many other fragments of political, polemical, and theoretical writing) into book form along with the essays. The result of this labor was finally published in 2011 as a two-book set, and Mettes burst onto the Dutch poetry scene for the second time. The work was widely reviewed, on blogs, in journals, magazines, and newspapers. Many critics who had not followed the blogs in 2005 showed themselves surprised, baffled even, by the intensity of Mettes’s critical writing. But for those who had read the blog, the main surprise was in the poetry. During Mettes’s lifetime, some of his poems had already been published in Parmentier . Although these were strong texts by themselves, in no way did they prepare readers for N30 . Nothing like it had been written in Dutch before. Instead, N30 explicitly follows the American tradition of Language Writing, directly referencing Ron Silliman and his concept of The New Sentence. However, it would seem that much of the poetical thinking around his use of this technique puts him closer to a writer such as Bruce Andrews. For Mettes, using non sequiturs as a unit of poetic construction was not only a way of reinventing formal textual construction, but it was another way of finding the fault lines in the social fabric. From the perspective of the Language tradition, one may put N30 somewhere between Silliman and Andrews. N30 shares an autobiographical element with Silliman’s New Sentence projects, and as in Andrews, there is a concern for mapping out social totality within text—what Mettes refers to as a “textual world civil war.” Again this shows a formal textual strategy for allowing the person “Jeroen Mettes” to be absorbed by the world, which here appears as a whirlwind of demotic and demonic chatter, full of violence, humor, intensity, beauty, disgust, sex, commerce, and strife. Influenced as it may by American precursors, Mettes’s tone and form end up quite different from his American counterparts, consistently referencing a world that is Dutch, all too Dutch, taking on the oppressive orderliness of Dutch society with its endemic penchant for consensus by introducing chaos into its daily life and laying bare its implicit aggressions. The work’s 31 chapters each have a different feel and rhythmical outline, but none of them follow a predetermined pattern. Rather, Mettes would consistently edit and reedit the text, randomly rewriting parts of it, as he explains in his poetical creed Politieke Poëzie (Political Poetry). N30 – referring to the 1999 antiglobalist protest in Seattle – was to be the first text of a trilogy. The work itself was written “in the mode of the present.” A second text was to be written in the mode of the future, and a third one, in the mode of the past, was going to be an epic poem about the Paris Commune, and to form an alternative poetic constitution for the European project. I still deeply regret that Jeroen Mettes never got to complete those projects, just as I would be very keen on knowing what he might have had to say about more recent political developments. Instead, in 2006, he remained stuck in the horrors of the present, that ended up consuming him completely. He left Dutch literature with some of its most piercing criticism and its most profoundly moving, exciting and powerful poetry. Excerpts from N30 Translated by Vincent W.J. van Gerven Oei from Jeroen Mettes. "N30." In N30+ . Amsterdam: De wereldbibliotheek, 2011. Published with permission of Uitgeverij Wereldbibliotheek, Amsterdam. Chapter 1 1999. A day is a space too. And another man, who had chained himself, had his ribs crushed, and a motor has driven over somebody’s legs. Dutch health care system spends ±145 million guilders per year on worriers. A spiderweb vibrates as I pass by. Randstad renovating. She slaps her bag against her ass: “Hurry up!” OPINION IS TRUE FRIENDSHIP Your skin. It doesn’t express anything. “But the use of the sword, that’s what I learned, and you’ll need nothing more for the moment.” Just try to interrogate a guy like that. Gullit in Sierra Leone. Codes silently lying all around. But that’s simply what belongs to “that it’s just allowed”: that sigh of “world” (a word expressing that the trees are now standing along the water like black men with white bags in their hair); that’s nothing else right? And you see how everything has to move, and first of all what cannot do so. Without Elysium and without savings, barbarians lashing out, horny for an enemy, staring across the water, staring into the air—staring to get out of it. “You’ve never showed me more than the mall,” she said. All those “dreams” in the end—and now? It was lying on the stairway, so I picked it up and took it upstairs. Chapter 3 “You know what?” Telecommunication. For love… I don’t really like that cheap cultural pessimism, but… The holy city is on pilgrimage in the earthly bodies of the faithful until the time of the heavenly kingdom has come. The end of an exhausting autumn day behind the computer, my eyes filled with tears of fatigue. KITCHEN / INSTALLATION / SPECIALIST. Network integration. In the sun, stretched out on a sheet. (…) I don’t believe what I’m reading, because I want to believe something else. An illusion? Suits me. There’s a variety of shapes and tastes… “So what?” you may think. 102 dalmatians can’t be wrong. But I want more, dear… A feel good movie. I’m smashing the burned body. So what? We continue to save the European civilization. What’s there to win? Plato with poets = Stalin without gulag? Ball against the crossbar. No wonder. She comes straight to her point. She’s standing in the kitchen eating an apple. (…) The godless Napoleon had used her as a stable and wanted to have her taken down. “Our” Rutger Hauer. Ready or not here I come. Psst… are you also wearing a string? Nobody understands our desire. Cliffs breaking the waves and shattering the sunset. I used to be a real romantic (as a poet). A typical fantasy used to be the one in which I brutally raped mother and daughter Seaver from the sitcom Growing Pains . Nevertheless you only contain bad words. Eyelashes. Automatic or manual? That your skin always in the afternoon. Integration. The air is empty. Too bad! Hand in hand on their lonely way. Alaska! Chapter 12 May 5, 2001 [10:00-10:30] A dust cloud on a hill. Globe. Indian (British) (tie) / pope. Damascus. Rape. We’re carrying the ayatollah’s portrait through the streets. At the moment the girl is mostly suede jacket with white ribbons on her sleeves. A small explosion flares up/impact. Camouflage. Close up. We’re analyzing the situation. He’s dead right? Dead dead. Dead. Everything without, these, and only with the body. Indices signal death. Dollar bills are printed in factories. Holes. Light patch. Globe in a box. Microphone. What’s the situation? Grey impact on a green hill (field?). The water is blue. He has no lips. Interns on the background with skirts that are too long. This is an example of a sonnet. An Islamic woman pushes against the door of an electronics shop. Arrows (percentages (prices)). Is this what awaits the American? Touch screen interface. The word, an island, can only be a sign in that situation. We pull up a chair, join in on the fun. On the shelves only books about computers. One glance in the distance is enough to lighten up a luna park in the distance. She’s really desperate, especially when she laughs. Click. Ah. Next. And now it’s raining, but that’s ok. Yellow stains sliding over the south. Shallow caves light: clothes, boots, electrical equipment. 45. 22:10. Nothing gives you the right to eat more than people starving to death. The Hague. Slam dunk. Traffic light. Two H’s, one L (standing for the L (little prick)). We’re happy to say something. Clouds, small suns, temperatures, cities. The truth is never an excuse. Yellow. Yellow. Green. Yellow. Yellow. Yellow. Yellow. Green. Green. Yellow. Will you email me? Skeleton: “No.” Ex-nerds in brand-new and brightly red sport cars. $$$. I love. Shihab. Hooves in the sand. Skinny senior with over-sized sunglasses; old jockey (cap, trophy) smiling in slow motion. And there I am again, flashback, crying with my head in between my hands. Sometimes I’ve got the feeling that cannibals. Eyes: blue. Cancer. Why would I wait until tomorrow? Golden beams protruding from the lifted/lit earth. May 5, 2001 [11:30-12:45] You’ll remember this for the rest of your life. Graphs, diagrams. Bu$ine$$. Blue shirt, white collar, no neck (porn star). A name lights up. I’m hysteric. Will you join us? Letters falling in their words. Fingers set up a tent and start to dance. Young entrepreneurs from poor neighborhoods (read: black) guided by Microsoft. Kinda makes me happy, that sort of kitsch. A sense of exhaustion/impotence to see anything but the present. (…) Wouldn’t you like to? Orange explosion in an industrial zone. YOU’RE DOING THIS FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. Would you. A familiar face. Clouds and blossom. Sunflowers. Supermodels. Mountainous area in a rectangle: shades of brown, from dark to beige, more green toward the south. Tents and next to them (it’s all a blur) people. Plane. Stadium. Geometrical block of people. No, I ain’t crying. I don’t speak no more. I just want. Quote + photo. (Positive:) screaming crowd. Three-piece suit, seen from the back, before entering the arena. On the back: “Daddy abused me.” Oh, bummer. State of emergency has been declared and everyone has to cooperate. She’s cut her wrists. What we do know (…) is that there’s never been a unique word, an imperative name, nor will there ever be. [Click here for work that suits you.] Barefooted children are watching it (coherent pieces revelation of what’s lying below). Who knows how she’s changed during those two years. “Everything used to be better” + sigh. And here we are. An empty field of parquet. A city lying behind it. Explosion. Blue. A rain drop falling in my coffee. May 5, 2001 [14:30-15:30] A young Arafat on video speaking with raised finger. “I’m calling from my convertible.” Names on walls, victims, numbers… Tourists. Yellow. Yellow. “Your own child! Really, what kind of human are you?” I don’t want to hear it no more. A woman jumping out of the water in a yellow bikini against a background of fireworks and the Cheops pyramid. Thy sorrow shall become good fortune, thy complaints laudation. All planets will float and wander. Wo die Welt zum Bild wird, kommt das System (…) zur Herrschaft. It is something, but is it? May 5, 2001 [18:30-19:00] Iris. Leaves. NASDAQ. Open / and white and. For the one who’s doing nothing, just waiting. (…) NO DEFEAT is made entirely up of defeat -- since / the world it opens is always a place / formerly / unsuspected. October 2002. “Jeroen, I’m leaving for the cemetery, byeeee.” The rise of the middle class. My entire oeuvre is an ode to the. My entire head is a fight against the. God always demands what you cannot sacrifice. You may take that the easy way, but… “The state hasn’t made us, but we make the state” (Hitler). A stork exits the elevator. Skeletons of. Moscow. Helsinki. Palermo. Paris. Chapter 30 Like your paradises: nothing. United Desire, as only remaining superpower. And even though the sea is now calmer and the wind is blowing pleasantly in my face… Heart! Who determines whether a tradition is “alive”? The yellow leaf or the white branch? Mars. This sentence is a typical example. Most Dutch people are happy. No consolation. When I see a girl sitting at a table with a book, a notepad, a pen, a bottle of mineral water, her hand writing in the light—then I consider that one thing. “Presents,” “poetry,” “classics.” We are what we cannot make from ourselves. “Left”: mendicant orders, missionaries. Saint-Just: “A republic is founded on the destruction of its enemies.” She crosses the street with a banana peel between her fingers. (…) We chose our own wardens, torturers, it was us who called all this insanity upon ourselves, we created this nightmare… But “no”? Girl (just like a beach ball) talking rapid Spanish (Portuguese?) in a mobile phone. Do I have a chance now that her boyfriend is getting bold? CLIO, horny bitch. What else do you want? An old woman, between the doors of the C1000, is suddenly unable to go on; her husband stretches out his hand, speaking a few encouraging words. Selection from. Der Führer schenkt den Jüden ein Stadt. How can it reach us if we haven’t been already reached somehow? It doesn’t “speak.” No problem. Each word she uses is a small miracle, as if she doesn’t belong to it, to language, but wanders around with a pocket light looking for the exit; she’s never desperate (maybe a little nervous), lighting up heavy words from the inside. But indeed, we’re free. But the predicate is not an attribute, but an event, and the subject is not a subject, but a shell. That’s why also samurai, knights, and warriors raised the blossom as emblem: they knew how to die. Locked up in a baby carriage with a McDonald’s balloon. Blue helicopter, the blue sky. Whether you want to refer? The point is. How / Motherfucker can I sing a sad song / When I remember Zion? You’ll feel so miserable and worthless that you think: “If only I were dead!,” or: “Just put an end to it!” “So you’re an economist?” Her card—two little birds building a nest, her handwriting shaking—is still on the mantelpiece. Guevara: “No, a communist.” A straw fire, such was our life: rapidly it flared up, rapidly it passed. I’m fleeing, coming from nowhere. (…) Eazy-E drinking coffee with the American president. If I’d scream, would that be an event? Drown it: the cleaner it will rise up from the depths. No! The night, so fast… As if there’s something opened up in that face. Come on, we may not curse life. He shows me his methadone: “If you drink that all at once, you’ll die instantly.” The last one dictates how we should behave to deserve happiness. One shine / above the earth. “I want to go to Bosnia,” I said bluntly. I don’t even know the name of the current mayor. Let’s despise our success! “There is no future; this is the future. Hope is a weakness that we've overcome. We have found happiness!” Sun. Sushi. Volvo. I feel like a bomb about to explode at any moment. Makes a difference for the reconstruction right? The decor moves forward. Daughter of Nereus, you nymphs of the sea, and you Thetis, you should have kept his tired head above the waves! Alas! This sentence has been written wearing a green cap. I receive my orders from the future. A frog jumps into it. Her husband has turned the Intifada, which he follows daily on CCN, into his hobby, “to forget that he doesn’t have his driver’s license yet." Suddenly the sun slides over the crosswalk. Her (his?) foot is playing with the slipper under the table. Is this how I’m writing this book now? I’m not a fellow man. I hate you and I want to hurt you. These are my people. Their screaming doesn’t rise above the constantly wailing sirens which we've learned to ignore. My whole body became warm and suddenly started to tremble. Unfortunate is he who is standing on the threshold of the most beautiful time, but awaits a better one. Arafat’s “removal” is contrary to American interests. Jeep drives into boy. What you can do alone, you should do alone. A food gift from the people of the United States of America. Two seagulls. [...]. (shrink)

Vom 30. Mai bis 1. Juni 1963 fand an der Cornell-Universität eine kleine Tagung zur Natur der Zeit statt, ausgerichtet von den aus Wien stammenden Astrophysikern Hermann Bondi und Thomas Gold. Kurt Gödel war nicht anwesend. Dabei hatte der berühmte Mathematiker etwa 15 Jahre zuvor Arbeiten veröffentlicht, die ganz wesentlich und weitreichend mit dem Begriff der Zeit zu tun hatten.

So heftig und kontrovers wie der von Patsy L’Amour LaLove, einer an der HU Berlin promovierten Geschlechterforscherin, herausgegebene Essayband (Beißreflexe, 2017) wurde seit langer Zeit kein (wissenschaftliches) Buch mehr diskutiert. Es drängt sich der Eindruck auf, dass die sich selbst als aktivistische »Polittunte « verstehende Herausgeberin offensichtlich den Zeitgeist eines mit sich selbst strauchelnden Queerfeminismus getroffen habe: Solch eine Vielzahl an mehr als nur leidenschaftlichen Reaktionen allerlei Couleur konnte eine in erster Linie akademische Anthologie mit Texten zur aktuellen Verfassung der (...) LGBTIQ*-Kultur und -Szene sowie zum Stand der akademisch geführten und im Zweifelsfall auch gelebten Queer Studies seit geraumer Zeit nicht verzeichnen – was sich unter anderem in der mittlerweile nun vierten Auflage des Titels innerhalb eines Jahres seit Veröffentlichung niederschlägt. Im Zuge der Debatte, welche in den letzten Wochen und Monaten in verschiedensten Medien (Zeit, Tagesspiegel, NZZ, FAZ, Süddeutsche) um die Publikation entbrannte, haben sich sowohl die darin versammelten AutorInnen als auch Judith Butler, Sabine Hark, Paula-Irene Billa, Alice Schwarzer und andere zu Wort gemeldet. Der selbst als Autor in besagtem Band vertretene freie Journalist und Redakteur Dirk Ludigs beanstandet seinerseits, dass die queeren akademischen Diskurse unserer Tage einem toten Rennen gleichen. Der Stellungskrieg der Kulturtheorien verändere nicht nur nichts mehr in den Köpfen aller Teilnehmenden, seine Debatten gehen zudem noch praktisch spurlos an all jenen vorbei, zu deren Verbesserung der Verhältnisse sie angeblich geführt werden würden. Es sei, so die Position des selber seit den 80er Jahren in der queeraktivistischen Szene Berlins sozialisierten Autors, an der Zeit, die (zu) weitgehende Akademisierung queeren Denkens und Handelns kritisch zu hinterfragen und nach fruchtbaren Quellen für einen anderen queeren Aktivismus zu suchen. Eine entgegengesetzte Position vertritt Andrea Geier. Auch sie räumt ein, dass die Identitätspolitik in eine Krise geraten sei –der Vorwurf, dass mehr um die Anerkennung von Identitäten statt für deren Überwindung gekämpft werde, würde darüber hinaus von Neudeutungen postmoderner Theorien begleiten werden sowie von der Frage, ob sich aus akademischen Theoriediskursen überhaupt noch emanzipatorisches Potential gewinnen ließe. Ihr Beitrag erörtert aus akademisch geschulter und kritischer Perspektive diese Entwicklungen und plädiert mit Nachdruck für eine Debattenkultur, welche sich mit intersektional geschärftem Blick notwendig komplexen Aushandlungsprozessen der uns heute in all ihren komplexen Facetten und Problematiken begegnenden Identitätskultur und -politik auseinandersetzt. It has been a long time since a (scientific) anthology has been discussed so intensely and controversially as it has been the case with the volume of Patsy L’Amour LaLove (Beißreflexe, 2017), who achieved her PhD in Gender studies at the HU Berlin. It is not easy to shake off the impression that the editor, who thinks of herself as an activist »Polittunte« (political pansy) has captured the Zeitgeist of a queer-feminism that is at war with itself: a fact which is reflected in the multitude of rather passionate responses from all kinds of social backgrounds; no other first and foremost academic anthology composed of texts concerning the current constitution of the LGBTIQ*-culture and –scene as well as discussing the current status of academically argued and sometimes lived queer-studies has been able to garner so much attention. The huge success of this work is also reflected in this being the fourth edition within one year since its original publication. Referring to the debate kindled by the anthology which has been present in different newspapers over the past weeks and months (Zeit, Tagesspiegel, NZZ, FAZ, Süddeutsche), some of the authors have made a public statement as well as other public figures such as Judith Butler, Sabine Hark, Paula-Irene Billa and Alice Schwarzer. Free journalist and editor, Dirk Ludigs, who is an author of one of the articles from the anthology has since stated that today’s academic discussion concerning queer subjects resembles a dead heat. The practice of positional warfare in culture theories not only fails to evoke a change in the minds of its participants but rather passes by the very people whose circumstances it originally helped to alleviate. Being an author of the Berlin queer-activist scene since the 1980s he states that it is time to challenge the (too) extensive academisation of queer thinking and action and to be on the outlook for other sources of queer activism. Andrea Geier supports a contradicting position; she, too, acknowledges the crisis of identity politics – the accusation that the fight is mainly about recognition of identity and less about the triumph over it is backed up by new interpretations of postmodern theories as well as the question of whether it is possible to gain emancipatory potential out of academic theory-driven discussions. Her article discussed these developments from an academically educated and critical perspective and expressively supports the call for a culture of debate that, with a keen eye for intersectional themes, discusses the necessarily complex negotiation processes of identity culture and politics in all their facets and inherent problems. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn der Nachkriegszeit war die bevorzugte Methode zur Nutzbarmachung von Flüssen die sogenannte integrierte Flussgebietsplanung (integrated river basin planning – IRBP), die eine ganzheitliche Betrachtung des Flussgebiets für eine Mehrzweckentwicklung erforderte. Während das Flusseinzugsgebiet in den Definitionen des IRBP-Konzepts als selbstverständliche natürliche Einheit der Planung angesehen wird, problematisiert dieser Artikel die Flusseinzugsgebietsidee und enthüllt die Politik hinter dem, was als natürlich (oder wissenschaftlich) gilt, mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf den Erfahrungen der Türkei mit IRBP. Er untersucht geopolitische und nationale Motivationen und (...) Herausforderungen im Zusammenhang mit politics of scale im Euphrat-Tigris-Becken. Indem es sich dem IRBP als einem Prozess der Skalenbildung nähert, stützt es sich auf Diskussionen über Skalenpolitik in der Literatur zur politischen Ökologie, und ergänzt diese Diskussionen um eine historische Tiefendimension hinzu. Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der politischen und ökologischen Geschichte der Südosttürkei, die zum Schauplatz des ersten und umfangreichsten IRBP-Projekts der Türkei wurde, dem Südostanatolien-Projekt (GAP).Der Artikel dehnt die chronologischen Grenzen des GAP auf die Jahrzehnte vor den 1970er Jahren aus, als das Projekt initiiert wurde. Die historischen Daten des Artikels basieren größtenteils auf den Sitzungsakten der Großen Nationalversammlung der Türkei, den Archiven einer Tageszeitung und den Expertenberichten zum GAP. Die Analyse hebt die Skalenpolitik als mächtigen Bestandteil der Politik der technologischen Entwicklung hervor und zeigt, wie wichtig die historische Analyse ist, um die Politik der Flusseinzugsgebiete in verschiedene Ebenen aufzuschlüsseln, darunter Geopolitik, territoriale Streitigkeiten und internationale Konflikte. (shrink)

Der Geschichtswissenschaft, und nicht nur ihr, ist unmerklich der Begriff der Wahrheit abhanden gekommen, und mit ihm auch derjenige von Tatsache und Quelle. Uber die Rankesche Absicht, lediglich zu sagen, wie es eigentlich gewesen, lacheln die Kenner. Wenn alles Text ist und alles Rhetorik, wenn man nicht mehr wissen will, was war, sondern nur noch, wie daruber geredet wurde, wenn vorgeblich die Beobachtung das Beobachtete schafft und alle Erinnerung irreparabel alles verfalscht, dann verschwimmen die Grenzen zwischen Wahrheit und Fiktion, geht (...) die Wirklichkeit verloren. Dabei ist wahr/nicht wahr der Code und das Gesetz aller Wissenschaft. Der Essay bezieht Stellung zu der Frage, ob der Historiker vergangene Wirklichkeiten erkennen kann, und ladt dazu ein, unbeeindruckt von zahllosen turns Wahrheit, Quelle, Tatsache weiterhin als Grundkategorien der Geschichtswissenschaft gelten zu lassen.". (shrink)

Viele meinen, die Seele habe sich in der von der Wissenschaft geleiteten Moderne verloren. Es gibt von ihr kein deutliches Bild mehr. Aber sie interpretiert sich selbst immer wieder neu - nicht, damit man sie am Ende nicht mehr versteht, sondern damit man in ihr wieder das sieht, was sie immer war: die Individuen ins Leben bringende, sie zusammenhaltende und in ihre innere Einigung rufende Kraft. Christof Gestrich untersucht den Paradigmenwechsel, der sich mit Bezug auf die Geschichtlichkeit der Seele eingestellt (...) hat, und der keineswegs zuerst aus der Philosophie oder der Theologie - den alten "Zustandigen" - hervorgegangen ist. In der neuen Erscheinung der Seele lassen sich sogar Religion und Wissenschaft vereinbaren. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag befasst sich mit der Mathematisierung in der praktisch-technischen Ausbildung im letzten Drittel des 18. und ersten Drittel des 19. Jahrhunderts. Anhand von zwei Fällen werden Variantenreichtum und Problemlagen des praktisch-mathematischen Wissens in der Zeit um 1800 herausgearbeitet. Nach einer Einführung zu institutionellem Rahmen und sozialem Status der praktischen Mathematiker (eigentlich mathematischen Praktiker) in den deutschen Gebieten, beschäftigt sich der erste Teil mit dem Bergmeister Johann Andreas Scheidhauer (1718–1784). Die Biographie dieses bislang wenig beachteten Praktikers führt zu einer Analyse (...) seiner Handschriften und deren Rezeption, in erster Linie durch Johann Friedrich Lempe (1757–1801), Professor für Mathematik an der Bergakademie Freiberg. Ein Praktiker der nachfolgenden Generation steht im Fokus des zweiten Teils. Carl Friedrich Steiner (1774–1840) war ein Baumeister im Weimar der Goethezeit. Gewissermaßen reflektiert sein Lehrbuch zur Geometry descriptive die Folgen der fortlaufenden Mathematisierung und den Stellenwert mathematischen Wissens in der Ausbildung junger Praktiker und Künstler. Beide Teilstudien geben Aufschluss zum historischen Verständnis praktischer Mathematik. (shrink)

This book examines the lasting influence of the academic culture wars of the late 20th century on the humanities and progressive politics, and what to make now of those furious debates over postmodernism, multiculturalism, relativism, critical theory, deconstruction, post-structuralism, and so on. In an effort to arrive at a fair judgment on that question, the book reaches for an understanding of postmodern theorists by way of two genres they despised; and hopes, for that reason, to do them justice. The story, (...) in its telling, justifies two basic claims: first, that the phenomenological/hermeneutical tradition is the most suitable source of theory for a humanism that aspires to be truly universal; and, second, that the ethical and political aspect of the human condition is authentically accessible only through narrative. In conclusion, it argues that the postmodern moment was a necessary one, or will have been if we rise to the occasion—and that that is its historical significance. (shrink)

Abstract“If it passes, then it was not true love.” On two Remarks by Wittgenstein about Love. Wittgenstein’s Nachlass does not contain many philosophical remarks on love. Yet, the ones it does contain can be made fruitful for the long-lasting philosophical debate on love’s nature. This text, however, focuses on just two of these remarks, preparing their discussion extensively by sketching part of the philosophical background against which their points become visible.

Das Leben ist ein fundamentales Phänomen unserer Welt. In der Theologie war das Leben immer schon eine zentrale Größe, eng verbunden mit dem Schöpfungshandeln Gottes. Für die Philosophie ist es eine bleibende Herausforderung, das Leben begrifflich zu fassen. In der Ausdifferenzierung der modernen Wissenschaften gibt es einen eigenen Wissenschaftszweig, den der Biologie, der sich mit den vielfältigen Formen des Lebens beschäftigt. Doch ist nach wie vor unbekannt, wie Leben überhaupt entstehen konnte. Die Beiträge dieses Buches widmen sich dem Lebensbegriff und (...) gehen seiner Bedeutungsvielfalt und Rätselhaftigkeit nach: Wie nähern sich die unterschiedlichen Disziplinen heute dem Leben? Welches Verhältnis hat das Leben zu fundamentalen Werten? Gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Leben und der Zeit oder zwischen dem Leben und dem Bewusstsein? (shrink)

John Rawls was the most influential political thinker of the twentieth century. This book applies his theory of justice to four perennial matters of concern that remain contested in the twenty-first century. Drawing surprising implications, this book deepens our understanding of these issues and points the way toward rational, just policy reform.

English summary: The compound terms formed with 'post-' - from Postmodernity through Postdemocracy to Postcrisis as the New Normal - can be seen as a symptom of theoretical helplessness. These compounds are based on a kind of dialectics which they explicitely refuse: The idea of a New Normal postulates a return to normalcy at the end of the series of crises in the early 21th century, but it states simultaneously that the old normalcy has eventually been lost forever. In order (...) to shed light on this question, theoretical effort is needed: This study proposes the concepts of normalism, interdiscourse, and collective symbolism. Taking seriously Michel Foucault's idea of a theoretical tool box, it introduces a new and operational concept of antagonism alternative to the one which originates from dialectics. Antagonism in an operational definition represents a dynamic of irriversible de-normalization (i.e. loss of normality, failure of normalism). Using these analytical instruments, categories such as Postmodernity and New Normal can be explained in a new and satisfying manner. The study hereby takes into consideration positions denying antagonism in Postmodernity (e.g. Francis Fukuyama) as well as theories which claim new kinds of antagonism (e.g. Negri and Hardt, Laclau and Mouffe, or Ranciere).These theoretical developments go together with topical analyses of the series of crises after 2001 and particularly after 2007: from the financial crisis through the Euro crisis to the refugees and populism crises. The analytical approach proposed here is particularly apt for studying the role of topical media as well as political discourses in normalization and denormalization processes. As a result, the study proposes a processual scheme of the series of crises as well as a new definition of populism based on the approach of normalism. Finally, it also considers the problems of alternative 'transnormalistic' ways out of the crisis ('flightlines').Interspersed with the study are short literary essays on novels dealing with current antagonisms: by Albert Camus, Thomas Bernhard, Sibylle Berg, Stephen King, Jean Marie Gustave Le ClEzio, Jonathan Littell, and Michel Houellebecq. German description: Die Krisenserie zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhundert, von der Finanz- und Eurokrise bis zur Fluchtlings- und Populismuskrise, hat die vorgangigen Normalitaten in vielen Dimensionen beeintrachtigt. Das lasst sich als Denormalisierung begreifen und wirft die Frage auf, wie soziokulturelle Normalitaten produziert und reproduziert werden. Darauf antwortet das hier aktualisierte, diskurstheoretische Konzept des Normalismus. Kann die Krisenserie sogar zu einem 'Ende der Normalitat' (Gabor Steingart) fuhren und was wurde das bedeuten? Das ist die Frage nach einer belastbaren Bedeutung des in den USA entstandenen Konzepts eines New Normal: Wenn es das Ende der Krisenserie meinen sollte - was unterscheidet es dann von einem 'Old Normal'? Und wie verhalt sich ein New Normal zum ebenso schillernden Begriff einer Postmoderne? Die Antwort der Studie auf solche Fragen kombiniert die Kategorien des Normalismus und des Antagonismus. Sie schlagt ein gegenuber seiner dialektischen Herkunft neues, diskurstheoretisch fundiertes und operatives (empirisch belastbares) Konzept von Antagonismus als tendenziell irreversible Denormalisierung vor. Mit diesem Instrumentarium wird zunachst die Postmoderne (einschliealich der anderen 'Postismen') als das Konzept einer vorgeblich historischen Epoche ohne Antagonismen gefasst. Anschlieaend werden die Krisenserien unter diesem Aspekt analysiert und ein vorlaufiges Prozessschema der Krisenverlaufe erstellt. Dabei wird auch die Krise der politischen Normalitat (Populismuskrise) transparent. Daraus ergibt sich ein Ausblick auf die Alternative zwischen der Gefahr eines katastrophischen Kollapses des Normalismus auf der einen und transnormalistischen Auswegen auf der anderen Seite. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz, werde ich die Frage des Naturalismus in Plessners Philosophie des organischen Lebens und seiner amerikanischen Rezeption, in besonders die philosophischen-biologischen Schriften von Marjorie Grene, untersuchen. Die amerikanische Philosophin Grene war die Hauptvertreterin Plessners im Englischen Sprachraum in 20sten Jahrhundert, die Plessners anthropologischen Argumentation in ihren Schriften zur Philosophie der Biologie aufgenommen und verwendet hat. Grene kritisierte in ihren frühen Schriften Heidegger, Sartre, und die Existenzphilosophie, die das menschliche Dasein von der Natur radikal absondert und die negative Affekte (...) wie Angst hervorhebt, in Vergleich mit Plessners weiterem Blick der Leibhaften, Sinnlichen, Tierischen Entwicklung des menschlichen Lebens. Die menschliche Existenz kann nicht dualistisch, wo „keine Brücke über den Abgrund zwischen Mensch und Tier führt,“ sondern nur biologisch-lebensphilosophisch oder ökologisch verstanden werden. Plessner und Grene setzen sich mit dem Reduktionismus des modernen Naturalismus auseinander und zeigen, wie das Natürliche weiter und ergänzt gedacht werden muss, weil der Naturalismus keine ausreichenden Begriffe für die Auslegung der Erscheinungen und Ausdrucksformen des organischen Lebens besitzt. Die Unterscheidung zwischen der "zentrischen Positionalität" des Tiers und der "exzentrischen Positionalität" des menschlichen Tiers ermöglicht eine holistisch aber differenzierte Beschreibung der Natur und Kultur, insbesondere die natürlichen Künstlichkeit, die der Kultur und das des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Diese sind Grundlage für die geschichtliche und soziale Bildung, Aufbau, und Strukturierung der natürlichen Spontaneität, Produktivität, und Expressivität des Lebens und ermöglichen die dezentrierte, utopische, und persönliche Individuation der einzelnen Menschen im Lebenszusammenhang, was wichtige soziologische und auch ethische und politische Konsequenzen für Plessner und Grene hat: Der Mensch ist ein natürliches biologisches Individuum, das durchaus fähig ist, eine verantwortliche Person zu werden , und zwar durch die umfassende Beteiligung an (oder als ein einzigartiger Ausdruck) einer Kultur. (shrink)

Angesichts der konstitutiven Bedeutung der Symbolisierung sowohl für die individuelle Entwicklung des Menschen als auch für die historische Entwicklung der Menschengattung wird die Frage nach den Wandlungen der Symbolisierung in der Postmoderne gestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass hinter dem postmodernen Karneval der Zeichen und Ekstase der Kommunikation eine tiefgreifende Desymbolisierung sowohl des Subjektiven als auch des Sozialen sich vollzieht. Als Folgen dieser Prozesse werden Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Reflexion und gesellschaftlicher Kritik abgeschafft. Das animal symbolicum hat sich im Zuge (...) der Postmoderne schrecklicherweise in ein animal desymbolicum verwandelt, das in einer verwüsteten Gesellschaft lebt, das seine lokale Erfahrung nicht transzendieren kann, weil es die Begriffe aufgelöst hat und die symbolische Ordnung in Gefahr gebracht hat und nach allem, was es begangen hat, in eine tiefe historische und soziale Amnesie gefallen ist. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 327-341 [Access article in PDF] The Rise of Postmodernisms and the "End of Science" Gerald Holton * [Errata]In a remarkable essay, "The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will," Isaiah Berlin leads up to a key question facing historians of ideas today. He begins with the observation that beliefs have entered our culture that "draw their plausibility" from a deep and radical revolt (...) against the central tradition of Western thought. That central tradition rested on the "pillars of the social optimism," which had found its fullest expression in the Enlightenment, "that the central problems of men are, in the end, the same throughout history; that they are in principle solvable; and that the solutions form a harmonious whole." 1But these pillars, Berlin notes, "came under attack toward the end of the eighteenth century by a movement first known in Germany as Sturm und Drang, and later in the many varieties of romanticism... and the many contemporary forms of irrationalism of both the right and the left, familiar to everyone today." In our time, in the alleged absence of "objective rules," the new rules are those made up by the rebels: "Ends are not... objective values," and "ends are not discovered at all but made, not found but created." And he concludes: "The prophets of the nineteenth-century predicted many things... but what none of them, so far as I know, predicted was that the last third of the twentieth century would be dominated by... the enthronement of the will of individuals or classes, and the rejection of reason and order as being prison houses of the spirit. How did this begin?" 2 As if to ensure that the question be considered central to the understanding of our age, Berlin adds that the explosion of irrationalism is one of the "outstanding characteristics of our century, the most demanding of explanation [End Page 327] and analysis." 3 Elsewhere he also appeals to seek the causes of "what appears to me to be the greatest transformation of Western consciousness, certainly in our time." 4Focusing my presentation chiefly on the aspects concerning science, one may well rephrase Berlin's question: how did it come about that we have passed again in many areas into what Susan Haack calls an "Age of Preposterism?" 5 -- that, for example, scientists, who are now in a period of spectacular advances of knowledge across the board, find a whole array of highly placed academics and journalists asserting that scientists' hopes to reach objective truths (two highly suspect words now) are in vain because there is no difference between the laws scientists find in nature and the arbitrary rules that govern baseball games; that science is "just one language game among others"; that we must "abolish the distinction between science and fiction"; that "The natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge"; and in any case, as the title of a current bestseller has it, we are at The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age." 6These are only a few glimpses, indicators of a stream of derogations, issuing from academe and the media. But happily, my concern here is not with the details of the current manifestation of what has been called the war on science but rather with examples of its historic lineage, with earlier phases of what Isaiah Berlin called the "Romantic Revolt." 7 Here we must begin our analysis by recognizing that any such multifaceted movement is best understood as a reaction against what went before, against what became so unsatisfactory or even intolerable as to cause the revolt.Historically, the most obvious and early reaction of this sort was the response to the breakthroughs in the seventeenth century that formed science and simultaneously signaled the great rupture from the ancient worldview, in which the individual, in principle, had been able to be both intellectually and spiritually comfortable. As one of the direct ancestors of romanticism, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744... (shrink)

Die konzentrierte innere Erfahrung der deutschen Mystik war eine wichtige Quelle der deutschen Philosophie. Nicht nur innerhalb der philosophischen Tradition, sondern auch in den Bauernkriegen des 16. Jahrhunderts und auch in der Reformation spielten mystische Motive eine beachtliche Rolle und übten in der Folgezeit Einfluß auf die Medizin (Paracelsus), aber auch auf die Dichtung und die Musik aus. Daß der Nationalsozialismus die Mystik jedoch für die eigene Ideologie mißbrauchte, hatte zur Folge, daß seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg der Einfluß der deutschen (...) Mystik auf die Entwicklung der ganzen deutschen Philosophie nahezu nicht thematisiert, eher tabuisiert wurde. Mystik selbst ist in erster Linie ein Wissen um die innere Erfahrung des Menschen, um das, was der Introspektion zugänglich ist. Aus ihr entsprangen nicht nur bedeutsame Impulse für das religiöse Bewußtsein, sondern auch für die ethische und ästhetische Sensibilität der Kultur insgesamt. Die Gegenwartsprobleme fordern zu einer Belebung der mystischen Traditionslinie heraus. Wenn wir nicht an die Äußerlichkeit der von Wissenschaft, Technik und Ökonomie dominierten Lebenswelt verfallen wollen, ist es unumgänglich, an diese eigenen Wurzeln zu erinnern. In dieser hier vorlegten Reihe von Beiträgen, die erstmalig diese Traditionslinie als systematischen und historischen Zusammenhang vorstellt, geht es um die Aneignung der eigenen Geschichte als der Verbindung der zwei Seiten unserer Kultur, des Äußeren und des Inneren. Das Innere ist durchaus nicht das Irreale, das Unwirkliche, auch wenn es nicht experimentell zu erschließen ist wie das in Raum und Zeit Gegebene. Das Innere ist nicht nur eine eigene Dimension, die Wirklichkeitscharakter besitzt, sondern darüberhinaus eine strukturbildende Kraft, die die Form unserer Außenwelt prägt. (shrink)

Die schriftstellerische Praxis Paul Valérys war äußerst reflektiert. Was verbindet Wörter und Gedanken? Was heißt Schreiben? Wo liegen die Grenzen des Darstellbaren? Wo enden die Zuständigkeiten des Bewußtseins? Wo beginnt das Schweigen? Der Aufsatz zeigt, wie der Selbstbeobachter Valéry mit mikrologischer Beharrlichkeit immer neue Dimensionen geistiger Existenz erschloß.

Die Betrachtungen, die ich Ihnen im Folgenden vortragen möchte, konzentrieren sich auf den Begriff der Gesellschaft in Fichtes Philosophie und überschneiden sich unvermeidlich mit einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen, wie er sich bei Fichte abzeichnet. Ausgangspunkt ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat: eine Unterscheidung, die philosophiegeschichtlich in Hegel ihren wichtigsten Exponenten hat, doch, obgleich nicht immer überlegt und vollständig ausgearbeitet, bereits in die Schriften vieler Autoren als Voraussetzung eingeflossen war. Und darüber hinaus war dies ein Gedanke, der auf (...) einer anderen, wenn man so will, niedrigeren Reflexionsebene in der deutschen Publizistik insbesondere gegen Ende des 18. Jh./anfang des 19. Jh. schon allgemein verbreitet war, das heißt zu einer Zeit, als das Thema der Staatsbildung in den größeren Ländern auf der Tagesordnung stand. Das Thema von einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen bei Fichte ist vornehmlich aus zwei Gründen von Bedeutung. Einerseits zeigt sich, wenn wir einfach auf das Wort »Politik« achten, daß es bei Fichte nicht oft zu finden ist: es steht in Verbindung mit Eigenschaften wie »Klugheit« oder »Geschicklichkeit« und bezeichnet alles andere als das Ergebnis einer wissenschaftlichen Forschung. Die Politik nimmt daher in Anbetracht der theoretischen Vorannahmen, die Fichtes Philosophie kennzeichnen, und des geringen Gewichts, das er der geschichtlichen Kontingenz bei der Forschung beimißt, nur eine bescheidene Stellung ein. Und in der Tat scheint der Zuständigkeitsbereich der Politik in der Rechtswissenschaft äußerst begrenzt: in ihn fällt nur eine geringe Anzahl von Fragestellungen, deren wichtigste die verschiedenen Regierungsformen betrifft, was jedoch keineswegs ein ausschlaggebendes Problem darstellt, sofern die »Wissenschaft« ihre Prinzipien richtig aufgestellt und in angemessener Weise miteinander verknüpft hat. Allerdings ist zu erwähnen, daß bei genauerer Betrachtung die Zahl der Fragestellungen, deren Lösung Fichte tatsächlich der Politik anvertraut, deutlich größer ist und sich auch auf eine Vielzahl von Bereichen erstreckt - bis hin zur wirtschaftlichen Organisation innerhalb eines Staates, um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen. In jedem Fall aber ist der Bereich der praktischen Politik und nicht der der politischen Theorie betroffen. Betrachtet man das Thema schließlich in Hinblick auf die aktiv an der Politik Beteiligten, stellt man fest, daß ihre Zahl sehr gering ist, da die politischen Rechte, sowohl was das aktive als auch das passive Wahlrecht anbetrifft, nur in begrenztem Maße anerkannt werden. (shrink)

Die Betrachtungen, die ich Ihnen im Folgenden vortragen möchte, konzentrieren sich auf den Begriff der Gesellschaft in Fichtes Philosophie und überschneiden sich unvermeidlich mit einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen, wie er sich bei Fichte abzeichnet. Ausgangspunkt ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Gesellschaft und Staat: eine Unterscheidung, die philosophiegeschichtlich in Hegel ihren wichtigsten Exponenten hat, doch, obgleich nicht immer überlegt und vollständig ausgearbeitet, bereits in die Schriften vieler Autoren als Voraussetzung eingeflossen war. Und darüber hinaus war dies ein Gedanke, der auf (...) einer anderen, wenn man so will, niedrigeren Reflexionsebene in der deutschen Publizistik insbesondere gegen Ende des 18. Jh./anfang des 19. Jh. schon allgemein verbreitet war, das heißt zu einer Zeit, als das Thema der Staatsbildung in den größeren Ländern auf der Tagesordnung stand. Das Thema von einer Neubewertung des Begriffs des Politischen bei Fichte ist vornehmlich aus zwei Gründen von Bedeutung. Einerseits zeigt sich, wenn wir einfach auf das Wort »Politik« achten, daß es bei Fichte nicht oft zu finden ist: es steht in Verbindung mit Eigenschaften wie »Klugheit« oder »Geschicklichkeit« und bezeichnet alles andere als das Ergebnis einer wissenschaftlichen Forschung. Die Politik nimmt daher in Anbetracht der theoretischen Vorannahmen, die Fichtes Philosophie kennzeichnen, und des geringen Gewichts, das er der geschichtlichen Kontingenz bei der Forschung beimißt, nur eine bescheidene Stellung ein. Und in der Tat scheint der Zuständigkeitsbereich der Politik in der Rechtswissenschaft äußerst begrenzt: in ihn fällt nur eine geringe Anzahl von Fragestellungen, deren wichtigste die verschiedenen Regierungsformen betrifft, was jedoch keineswegs ein ausschlaggebendes Problem darstellt, sofern die »Wissenschaft« ihre Prinzipien richtig aufgestellt und in angemessener Weise miteinander verknüpft hat. Allerdings ist zu erwähnen, daß bei genauerer Betrachtung die Zahl der Fragestellungen, deren Lösung Fichte tatsächlich der Politik anvertraut, deutlich größer ist und sich auch auf eine Vielzahl von Bereichen erstreckt - bis hin zur wirtschaftlichen Organisation innerhalb eines Staates, um nur ein Beispiel zu nennen. In jedem Fall aber ist der Bereich der praktischen Politik und nicht der der politischen Theorie betroffen. Betrachtet man das Thema schließlich in Hinblick auf die aktiv an der Politik Beteiligten, stellt man fest, daß ihre Zahl sehr gering ist, da die politischen Rechte, sowohl was das aktive als auch das passive Wahlrecht anbetrifft, nur in begrenztem Maße anerkannt werden. (shrink)

Die Kritik der Rabbinen an Gott erweist sich keineswegs als eine Schwächung der Glaubenskraft oder gar als verhüllter Atheismus; sie weist zwar dadurch, daß sie nur bei Einzelnen auftritt und nicht eigentlich die Stimme der Gemeinde, d. h. einen sensus communis, darstellt, auf die Tatsache hin, daß es Richtungen, Spaltungen, Häresien im Rabbinismus gegeben hat - eine Tatsache, die uns auch ohnedies schon bekannt ist. Das Bemerkenswerte jedoch daran ist, daß die kritischen Elemente ertragen worden sind und das Judentum der (...) Kritik in seiner eignen Mitte standgehalten hat: die jüdische Gemeinde ist daran nicht zugrunde gegangen, ihr Glaube war stark genug, auch damit fertig zu werden. Ferner darf man diese Kritik an der Gottheit, sogar als einen Erweis lebendigen Umgangs mit ihr betrachten: Gott ist gleichsam auch der Gefährte des Menschen, nicht nur der Herr, und diese Einstellung des Rabbinismus mag als ein fast notwendiges Supplement - oder wenn man will, ein Korrelat - zur Vorstellung von der Überweltlichkeit Gottes und von seinem Getrenntsein von der Welt, wie sie sonst das Judentum bestimmt, angesehen werden. Gott als der Gefährte des Menschen begegnet uns ja auch gelegentlich im Neuen Testament: er bedarf, obschon der "Herr der Ernte", der Erntearbeiter Mt. 9,38, d. h. aber der Gehilfen; noch deutlicher bringt dies der paulinische Terminus Mitarbeiter Gottes, I. Cor. 3,9 u. ö., zum Ausdruck. Die Kritik an Gott ist gleichzeitig eine Krit i k a m Menschen. Sie betrifft ja den Schöpfer, dessen Werk in der Erschaffung des Menschen gipfele32). Jüdische Kreise, die die Schöpfung abwerten, nehmen am Geist der Zeit teil. Auch bewirken gnostische Ideen durch die Aufstellung von Mittlerwesen eine Entfernung der Gottheit von der Welt: er nimmt nicht mehr unmittelbar an ihr teil. Gottes Macht wird beschränkt durch die Hypostasierung seiner Eigenschaften. Der Anthropomorphismus, von einem Teil der Schriftgelehrten zu beheben oder zu mildern versucht, wird bei anderen umso stärker, und sie drücken darin ihren Hader mit Gott aus: er ist trotzig gegen die Bitten der Gemeinde, er verwechselt Namen und ist vergeßlich, ja er entzieht sich seinem eignen Gesetz oder den ethischen Verpflichtungen, die er selbst geboten hat. Aber wiederum, von der anderen Seite gesehen: Gott leidet mit seinem Volk, er ist ohnmächtig, demütig, weint und klagt, trauert um Stadt und Tempel, ist erlösungsbedürftig und ringt mit sich selbst um sein Erbarmen. Man könnte dies die positive Seite der rabbinischen Kritik an Gott nennen. Auf zwei große Motive läßt sich diese Kritik zurückführen : auf eine Fortführung des alttestamentlichen Dispute zwischen Gott und Menschen, wobei gleichzeitig eine Veränderung der biblischen Gottesvorstellung nach der spekulativen Seite hin erfolgt - und auf das Interesse a n der Entlastung der bedrängten Gemeinde. Es sind Motive, die in der Weiterentwicklung des Judentums unvermeidlich waren. Auch andere große Religionen haben unter dem Druck solcher Anfechtungen gestanden. Auch dem Islam und dem Christentum ist solche Kritik nicht fremd geblieben. Was den Islam betrifft, so ist Verfasser durch einen Vortrag von Hellmut Ritter im Orient-Institut Frankfurt/Main über "die Kritik an Gott bei den persischen Mystikem"33) zu vorliegender Untersuchung angeregt wor den. Wenn auch die Erscheinungswelt der islamischen, zumal der persischen Mystik von derjenigen der Rabbinen so verschieden ist wie nur möglich, da es sich dort meist um Extravaganzen des Typus des "närrischen Heiligen" handelt, der die Freiheit hat, auch die radikalsten Gedanken über die Gottheit zu äußern, ohne daß er sein praktisches Verhalten der Ergebung in Gott ändert, so haben doch b e i d e Welten das eine gemeinsam, daß es die Not ist, die hier ein entscheidendes Wort mitspricht. Im Christentum ist die Kritik an Gott lediglich verhüllter dank der Idee der Menschwerdung Gottes und der ins Dogma eingebauten Theorie vom Mittler; aber sie ist nichtsdestoweniger vorhanden und bricht in Zeiten der Krisis hervor. Schon die Theodizee, die positive Seite der Kritik an Gott, setzt voraus, daß der Mensch nicht um eine Recht-fertigung Gottes herumkommt; das aber hat wieder zur Voraussetzung, daß der Mensch Gott Vorwürfe macht. So tut es z. B. LUTHER, der "in seinen seelischen Kämpfen Gott besonders Härte und Ungerechtigkeit vorgeworfen hat"34). Diese Kritik ist zuletzt notwendige Begleiterscheinung jedes ernsthaften, sich um sich selber mühenden, nicht scholastisch erstickten Glaubens. Auch über die Kritik der Rabbinen an Gott kann schließlich kein anderes Urteil gefällt werden, als daß sie die dialektische Überwindung der Negation mittels ihrer ehrlichen Durchschreitung darstellt. (shrink)

Was konnen Rechtsvergleich und Rechtsgeschichte leisten? Der Autor beantwortet diese Frage mit Blick auf die Gesetzgebungslehre des deutschen Juristen und Philosophen Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Er weist nach, dass dessen Gesetzgebungslehre sich im Bereich des Privatrechts grundsatzlich durchsetzte und auf die Gesetzgebung der fruhen Neuzeit grossen Einfluss hatte, obwohl Thomasius kein originales Gesetzbuch verfasste. Der Jurist war der Meinung, man konne durch Rechtsvergleich vermuten, dass eine heimische Sitte, die den gemeinsamen Sitten vieler Volker bzw. dem Volkergemeinrecht entspreche, geeignet sei, ins Gesetzbuch (...) aufgenommen zu werden. Er stutzte diesen Vergleich durch historische Betrachtungen.". (shrink)

Die Trias Martyria, Leiturgia, Diakonia ist vielen als Zusammenfassung der Grundvollzüge oder auch Grundfunktionen der Kirche vertraut und geläufig. Sie wird - zu Recht - mit dem II. Vatikanischen Konzil und dessen Rezeption in Verbindung gebracht. Weniger bekannt ist aber die Herkunft dieser Trias. In dieser Weise formuliert wurde sie erstmals im Rahmen der Evangelischen Michaelsbruderschaft wohl bereits im Rahmen einer Probebrüderwoche im Jahr 1935, dann in dem Werk „Bruderschaft" von Wilhelm Stählin im Jahr 1940. Die Michaelsbruderschaft hat zahlreiche ökumenische (...) Kontakte gepflegt, so auch zu katholischen Theologen unmittelbar vor dem II. Vatikanischen Konzil. Das ökumenische Wirken der Michaelsbruderschaft war nachhaltiger, als ihr Einfluss innerhalb der Evangelischen Kirche. Die Rezeption der Trias ist ein Beispiel für einen latenten Transfer verschütteter ökumenischer Gemeinsamkeit.The triad of Martyria, Leiturgia, Diakonia is well known as an aggregation of the basic functions of the church. It is - for good reasons - often seen in the context of the Vatican II and its reception. Less known is the origin of this triad. In the above way it was apparently first drafted at a trial week of the Evangelische Michaelsbruderschaft in 1935, later then in the 1940 book „Bruderschaft" by Wilhelm Stählin. The Michaelsbruderschaft maintained several oecumenical contacts, also with catholic theologians right before the Vatican II. The oecumenic work of the Michaelsbruderschaft was more sustainable than its influence in the protestant church. The reception of the triad is an example of a latent transfer of buried oecumenic commonality. (shrink)

The die-hard viewpoint of an influential figure like President M.T. Steyn of the Republic of the Orange Free State led to the lengthening of the Anglo-Boer War by more than a year. The reasons for Steyn leading the Free State into this war, the reasons for his call not to surrender and the effect of the war on the Afrikaner, is discussed in this article. An ethical discussion of factors indicating a bitter end, is also on the cards. There was (...) a strong realisation among the representatives of the Republics of the Free State and the Transvaal in 1902 that this is the end of the war. (shrink)

Introduction. The lexeme “myth” is ordinary for a modern person, but its meaning is a vague circle of definition. The author sets the question — how does modern man understand the myth, how does he use it, and what approaches to studying the manifestations of the mythological are used in modern science. But in order to correctly answer these questions, it is necessary to clarify the concept of “modernity”. According to the author, it is possible to correctly substantiate the concept (...) of modernity by using the method of paradigm analysis by A.G. Dugin. In line with this approach, the concept of “modernity” is conceptually identical to the postmodern paradigm. The purpose of the study is to conduct a revision of modern literature (literature of the postmodern paradigm) devoted to the scientific study of the myth and the manifestations of the mythological in human existence, to analyze it in line with the paradigm approach. Introduce new sources into scientific circulation and, on the basis of a combination of new and existing sources, offer a detailed historiographic review of the literature. Methods. The main method used in this work is the paradigm analysis by A.G. Dugin. In addition to it, a systematic approach and general scientific methods were used — analysis and synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction. Scientific novelty of the research. The main scientific novelty of the study is the use of the method of paradigm analysis in the study of the mythological. In addition, a number of new sources (published in the period from 2020 to 2022) dedicated to the topic of myth are being introduced into scientific circulation. Results. Within the framework of this article, more than 60 works were analyzed and, on their basis, an exhaustive historiographic review of the existing modern literature devoted to the study of myth and manifestations of the mythological in human being was made. Conclusion. Considering the presented literature in line with the paradigm approach, the author explicates the main aspects of the study of the mythological, which are characteristic of this paradigm and suggests further vectors of its development. According to the author, the myth is increasingly integrated into the digital and virtual environment, which actualizes the need to study it already in the mainstream of digital anthropology. The author also puts forward the thesis that digital literacy skills can help reduce the ideological load of the myth, which manifests itself in the digital environment in the form of fake news and other tools of hybrid wars. (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Antike in Poetik und Kunsttheorie: Von Ausgang des Klassischen Altertums bis auf Goethe und Wilhelm von Humboldt Mit dem Erscheinen des zweiten Bandes von Borinskis Werk wird das 1919 bei Beginn der Neuen Folge unserer Sammlung gegebene Versprechen eingelost. Ich habe vor allem die Tatkraft und die Opferwilligkeit zu ruhmen, die der Verlag an diese Sache gesetzt hat und zwar unter den schwierigsten Umstanden, welche selbst die dankenswerterweise gewahrte Unterstutzung der deutschen Notgemeinschaft alsbald aulserlidi entwerteten. Freilidx blieb (...) davon der innere Wert unberuhrt, der in der Anerkennung von Borinskis Verdienst durch eine so berufene Seite zu erblicken war. In wenig Teilen der Sammlung kommt deren Grundgedanke so stark zum Ausdrudc wie in den zwei Banden Borinskis, ein Gedanke, dessen Fruchtbarkeit sich auch darin zeigt, dal Zneuerdings im Inland wie im Aus land gleichartige Unternehmen hervorgetreten sind. Gewil 3 wird es andrerseits immer deutlicher, da Bdie Antike keineswegs nur ein geschichtli(hes Element unserer Kultur ist, das blol 3 noch wegen des genetisdien Verstandnisses eben dieser Kultur unentbehrlich ware, und zwar gerade auch mit den Erscheinungen ihres Nad1lebens: vielmehr beginnt sie nunmehr wiederum unmittelbare Lebenskrafte zu entfalten. (Was zu ubersehen wohl nur dem erstaunlichen Bildungsmangel moglich ist, mit dem gewisse radikale und fur ihre wichtige Aufgabe vollig unqualifizierte Schulverwaltungen das Andenken ihrer eigenen Fuhrer Lassalle und Pernerstorffer geschandet haben. Quousque tandem?) Fur die Wissenschaft bleibt in jedem Falle die Aufgabe geschichtlichen Verstehens auch weiterhin wesentlich, - nur von hier aus wird zu verhuten sein, dal 3 jene an sich sehr erfreulidie neue Hinwendung zur Antike nidit schlieBlich wiederum bei einem Klassizismus endet, der zum Unterschied von seinem gedankenklaren Vorganger einen voluntaristischen Grundzug haben und uns ganz einseitig im Zeitalter des altertumlichen und tragischen Griechentums festhalten wurde. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

English summary: Snell's magnum opus The Discovery of the Mind was in 1946 important for the reorientation of the postwar generation wrote DIE ZEIT upon Bruno Snell's 90th birthday in 1986. His continuously expanded compilations, dealing with studies on the formation of the European spirit by the Greeks, have since been translated into many world languages. Sixty years after their, first publication they have not lost inspiration. For his student Walter Jens, The Discovery of the Mind is the work of (...) a Hellenist, who is also an excellent writer. German description: Snells Hauptwerk Die Entdeckung des Geistes war 1946 wichtig fur die Neuorientierung der Nachkriegsgeneration, befand DIE ZEIT zu Bruno Snells 90. Geburtstag 1986. Seine in diesem Buch zusammengestellten und immer wieder erweiterten Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Geistes bei den Griechen sind seither in alle Weltsprachen ubersetzt worden. Sie haben auch sechzig Jahre nach ihrer Erstveroffentlichung nichts von ihrer Inspiration verloren. Fur seinen Schuler Walter Jens ist Die Entdeckung des Geistes das Buch eines Grazisten, der ein vorzuglicher Schriftsteller ist. Die hier vorliegende 9. Auflage ist gegenuber der 8. Auflage unverandert. (shrink)

Wenn der Übergang von der antiken zur mittelalterlichen und modernen Philosophie als Übergang von den metaphysischen zu erkenntnistheoretischen Problemen des Menschen charak¬terisiert wurde, so lässt sich der Übergang von der modernen zur gegenwärtigen, bzw. "nachmetaphysischen" Philosophie als eine Kehre vom abstrakten Subjekt zum konkreten, in der Welt situierten Ich - zum "Mich" kennzeichnen. Gerade diese "neo-sokratische" Revolution der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts drückt für die Autorin die wesentliche Tendenz zur Anthropologisierung der gnoseologischen und ontologischen Problematik beziehungsweise ihre differentia specifica aus. (...) Die Verfasserin betont, dass im Laufe dieser Kehre nicht nur die sogenannte "Philosophie des Menschen" (die Lebensphilosophie, die philosophische Anthropologie, der Existentialismus, der Personalismus, die Phänomenologie des Lebens u.a.), sondern auch ihre wichtigsten Alternativen (der Dekonstruktivismus, der Postmodernismus, der Feminismus) sich als Negation des abstrakten Subjekts der Modernität formiert und entwickelt haben. Diese "anti¬moderne Einstellung" entstand im 19. Jahrhundert als Widerstand gegen den Glauben, dass die Vernunft der Gesetzgeber der Wirklichkeit sei, um mit Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger und Foucault zur Nicht-Philosophie überzugehen und sich schließlich, in den 80er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, in eine Thematisierung des Endes zu verwandeln. So bleibt heute, in der Epoche des "Ende", des Endes der "Großen Erzählungen", der Großen Illusionen, der all¬umfassenden, totalen und totalitären Systeme, heute, wo nicht nur Gott, Marx und Kommu¬nismus für tot erklärt sind, sondern auch "der Mensch" mit seinen klassischen Attributen von Kosmotheros, Held und Herrscher, zweifellos nur eines - nicht das identitätsstifende Cogito, sondern das Ende selbst. Das Ende als Fragestellung, als Diskurs über uns und es selbst. Wenn die Frage des Endes eigentlich die große Frage des Sinnes und des Ganzen ist, so ist der Grund dafür die Tatsache, dass in dem gigantischen Haufen des "Alles", das die postmoderne Welt der Ge-gensätze bildet, der Sinn völlig verwischt ist, so dass anscheinend eine einzige Frage übrig geblieben ist: "What are you doing after the orgy?" Was bleibt übrig, wenn alles verfügbar geworden ist? Es scheint als ob die sogenannte "obèse", oder Hypertelie der postmodernen Welt, para¬doxerweise das Zeugnis des letzten Stempels der Apokalypse. Und vielleicht ist das, was die ge¬genwärtige Philosophie interpretiert oder zu Ende als Ende (be)schreibt, eigentlich nur das letzte Kapitel des ältesten Drehbuchs der Welt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 Reviews 187 NUCLEAR WAR AND WORLD CITIZENSHIP Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa [email protected] Robert Hinde and Joseph Rotblat. War No More: Eliminating Conflict in the Nuclear Age. London and Sterling, Va.: Pluto P., 2003. Pp. x, 228. £40.00; us$50.00; isbn 0745321925 (hb). £11.99; us$17.95 (pb). ast year marked the 50th anniversary of the Russell–Einstein Manifesto, Lwhich sought (...) to put the world on guard against the hydrogen bomb’s dangers. The last surviving signatory to the manifesto was Joseph Rotblat, who died on 31 August 2005. In 1995, Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace. During World War ii, Joseph Rotblat participated in the Manhattan Project to develop an atomic bomb. An Encyclopaedia Britannica article on his Nobel prize explains that “Although he was uncomfortable about participating in the creation of an atomic bomb, Rotblat initially believed that the weapon would be used only to deter a German threat. After learning in 1944 that it would be used to contain the Soviet Union, a World War ii ally, he left the project….” Upon returning to England in 1945, Rotblat left defence work for medical research. He served as founding secretary-general and later as president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, which began in 1957 and at which key scientists and others from different countries could confer about the peril of nuclear weapons facing the world. As a medical physicist at London University’s St. Bartholomew’s Hospital Medical College (1950–76), Rotblat directed attention toward the biological hazards of nuclear radiation and the severity of fallout from atmospheric testing. He worked closely with Russell in the 1950s and early ’60s and still visited him in his last years. (See his “Personal Reminiscences”, Russell, 18 [1998]: 5–24.) The book’s co-author, Robert Hinde, is the author of numerous books and articles in psychology. The book addresses the planet’s current state in terms of weapons of mass destruction. It features many tables and charts on matters ranging from the varying levels of the super-powers’ nuclear warhead stockpiles to the principal nuclear arms control treaties to estimates of military deaths in individual wars during the last 60 years. Since this book is an earnest endeavour to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction, many of its most fundamental prescriptions sound basic, even _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2602\REVIEWS.262 : 2007-01-24 01:12 188 Reviews somewhat banal. To be sure, the authors acknowledge that “Any attempt to discuss ways of preventing war must address very basic issues, and in so doing lays itself open to accusations of mushy idealism” (pp. 214–15). In War No More the authors opt to err in the direction of moral truisms as a small price to pay if there is a chance of contributing to a discussion eventually compelling the world’s political leaders to heed such moral considerations. In the prevention of conflict, “Often the success of such efforts may be unknown to the wider world just because the criterion of success is simply that nothing happens” (p. 198). Hinde and Rotblat urge their readers to understand the absolute need to abolish war if humanity is to endure in this nuclear age. Their position is that “the very possession of nuclear weapons is immoral. Their enormous destructive power, inflicted on civilians even more than on the military, would make their use unforgiveable” (p. 139). The authors expressly credit Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein with having taken the initiative for international action on this front (p. 189). And as was the view of Russell and Einstein 50 years earlier, Hinde and Rotblat proclaim in their book that “The only solution is international agreement on the total abolition of nuclear weapons” (p. 139). Hinde and Rotblat concede the ease with which people can be pessimistic about the prospects of abolishing war. However, the formidable challenge posed by such a task is deemed “no excuse for inaction”. They cite historic instances in which humanity has... (shrink)

My starting point is the first major American military action in World War II in Europe, “Operation Torch.” The action was controversial because the American military regarded it as militarily useless, if not counterproductive. But the military was overruled by President Roosevelt on the grounds that, while it was not militarily necessary, it was politically justified. This indifference to military necessity seems to violate standard rules about the legitimacy of military force. The larger question it raises is the relation between (...) military concerns and political ones in warfare. Much of this essay explores the relation between these two dimensions in war: the military dimension and the political dimension. I argue that the second dimension is the most important one, as well as the most problematic one for the legitimacy of war. Yet it is ignored by standard just war theories. I then return at the end to consider again the problems raised by “Operation Torch,” and especially the question of the harms inflicted on a country’s own soldiers – in the name of killing and dying for public relations. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud was an Austrian neurologist and the founder of psychoanalysis, a clinical method for treating psychopathology through dialogue between a patient and a psychoanalyst. Freud was born to Galician Jewish parents in the Moravian town of Freiberg, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He qualified as a doctor of medicine in 1881 at the University of Vienna. Upon completing his habilitation in 1885, he was appointed a docent in neuropathology and became an affiliated professor in 1902. Freud lived and worked in (...) Vienna, having set up his clinical practice there in 1886. In 1938 Freud left Austria to escape the Nazis. He died in exile in the United Kingdom in 1939. (shrink)

In der gesamten Neuzeit war Freiheit ein Schlüsselbegriff für das Selbstverständnis Europas und Deutschlands. Doch was galt hierzulande zu welchen Zeiten als "Freiheit"? Wie und von wem wurden in Deutschland seit der Frühaufklärung Freiheitsvorstellungen formuliert, diskutiert oder auch machtpolitisch vereinnahmt? Anhand ausgewählter Texte aus vier Jahrhunderten verdeutlicht dieses Buch, dass sich Freiheitsvorstellungen in Deutschland wandelten. Der Begriff blieb jedoch stets eine zentrale politische Kategorie, um das Verhältnis des Einzelnen zur Gesellschaft zu verhandeln. Immer bewegte er sich dabei im Spannungsfeld von (...) Selbstbestimmung und Kontrolle, Freizügigkeit und Sicherheit, Alterität und Konformität, Emanzipation und Diskriminierung, Gleichheit und Ungleichheit - also von Themen, die auch heute noch ins Mark der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Debatten treffen. (shrink)

Wer die Entwicklung der philosophischen Forschung der letzten zehn Jahre mit aufmerksamem Blicke verfolgte, dem konnte es nicht entgehen, dass in der Auffassung des Verhältnisses von Psychologie und Logik eine Wandlung eintrat oder sich wenigstens anbahnte. Anfangs hatte es den Anschein, als ob die Psychologie die Stellung einer ersten und herrschenden Disciplin erhalten sollte. Das Erkennen und Denken sind doch Bewusstseinsthatsachen und anderseits Voraussetzungen aller Wissenschaften und somit auch der Philosophie. Was lag näher, als die Wissenschaft von den Bewusstseinsthatsachen, die (...) Psychologie, als grundlegende philosophische Disciplin zu betrachten, ja noch mehr, sie zur Grundlage aller Wissenschaften zu machen. Allmählich aber brach sich der Gedanke Bahn, dass vom Erkennen und Denken als Bewusstseinsthatsachen das Erkannte und Gedachte sorgfältig unterschieden werden müsse und dass die Untersuchung hierüber eher das Recht in Anspruch nehmen könne als Voraussetzung aller Wissenschaften und als grundlegende philosophische Disciplin zu gelten. So trat die Logik an die Stelle der Psychologie; sie nahm wieder, wie ehemals in der Philosophie, unter den philosophischen Disciplinen die erste Stelle ein. Aber Hand in Hand damit ging auch eine andere Auffassung der Logik. Man begnügte sich nicht mehr mit einer Behandlung der blossen Formen des Denkens, sondern Fragen, die den Inhalt des Denkens und Erkennens, das Gedachte und Erkannte betreffen, wurden in immer grösserer Zahl in die Logik hineingezogen. Die Logik wurde aus einer formalen Disciplin, zu der sie unter dem Einflusse Kants geworden war, in eine erkenntnistheoretische Disciplin umgestaltet. Das hatte seinen Grund nicht bloss in der Entwicklung der philosophischen Forschung, sondern wird auch durch die Natur der Sache gefordert. (shrink)

English summary: Snell's magnum opus The Discovery of the Mind was in 1946 important for the reorientation of the postwar generation wrote DIE ZEIT upon Bruno Snell's 90th birthday in 1986. His continuously expanded compilations, dealing with studies on the formation of the European spirit by the Greeks, have since been translated into many world languages. Sixty years after their, first publication they have not lost inspiration. For his student Walter Jens, The Discovery of the Mind is the work of (...) a Hellenist, who is also an excellent writer. German description: Snells Hauptwerk Die Entdeckung des Geistes war 1946 wichtig fur die Neuorientierung der Nachkriegsgeneration, befand DIE ZEIT zu Bruno Snells 90. Geburtstag 1986. Seine in diesem Buch zusammengestellten und immer wieder erweiterten Studien zur Entstehung des europaischen Geistes bei den Griechen sind seither in alle Weltsprachen ubersetzt worden. Sie haben auch sechzig Jahre nach ihrer Erstveroffentlichung nichts von ihrer Inspiration verloren. Fur seinen Schuler Walter Jens ist Die Entdeckung des Geistes das Buch eines Grazisten, der ein vorzuglicher Schriftsteller ist. Die hier vorliegende 9. Auflage ist gegenuber der 8. Auflage unverandert. (shrink)

Auf den ersten Blick scheint Selbstbewusstsein zu dem zu gehören, was sich nahezu von selbst versteht. In anhaltendem Nachdenken stellt sich aber heraus, dass mit ihm der Philosophie eines ihrer schwierigsten und folgenreichsten Probleme aufgegeben ist. Vor über fünfzig Jahren erschien Dieter Henrichs Abhandlung Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht, welche dieses Problem ausarbeitete. Sie zeigte, dass es Fichte war, der als erster das Problem sicher erfasste und zum Leitthema seines Denkens werden liess. Dem unveränderten Abdruck dieses Textes folgt nun -- als um (...) ein Vielfaches umfangreicherer Haupttext -- eine neue Folge von Überlegungen. Sie betreffen Selbstbewusstsein im Zusammenhang einer philosophischen Grundlegung und die Probleme, die Fichtes Systembildung unter dem Leitgedanken seiner ursprünglichen Einsicht in eine Bewegung ohne definitive Lösung versetzten. Henrichs Buch lässt sich als eine Erneuerung von Kants Denkart betrachten - in der Beziehung auf ein Thema, dessen Bedeutung für die Philosophie kaum noch bestritten wird, in einer der Erfahrungsart der Gegenwart gemässen Perspektive und in der Folge von Klärungen, die zu gewinnen sind, wenn man der Dynamik in Fichtes Systembildungen nachdenkt."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Weltanschauung Platos: Dargestellt im Anschluss an den Dialog Phadon Kap. 2. N ach dieser Auscinandersetzung des I'hadon fragt Echekrates von neuem nach den Umstanden bei dem Tode des Sokrates, was dabei gesprochen und gethan worden, und welche von seinen Freunden zugegen gewesen waren. Phadon erklart zunachst, dass er dabei in eine wunderbare Stimmung ge kommen sei. Trotz des bevorstehenden Todes eines ihm teuern Mannes erfullte doch nicht das Gefuhl des Mitleides seine Brust; denn gluckselig erschien ihm der (...) Mann hinsicht lich seines Verhaltens sowohl als seiner Reden. Furchtlos und edel ging er in den Tod, so dass I'hadou der Gedanke vor die Seele trat, dass Sokrates auch in den Harles nicht ohne gottliche Schickung hinabsteige, und dass es ihm auch dort wohl ergehen werde, wenn sonst je einem. Aber auch Freude zog nicht bei ihm ein, wahrend sie doch mit philosophischen Fragen beschaftigt waren; sondern es war ein geradezu seltsa mer Zustand, in welchem er sich befand, gemischt aus Freude und aus Schmerz zugleich. In diesem Zustande befanden sich so ziemlich alle Anwesenden, indem sie bald lachten, manch mal auch weinten. Einer von ihnen ganz besonders, Apollodoros. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Arnold Berleant gilt als einer der Gründerväter der environmental aesthetics, zu der er seit den 1970er-Jahren veröffentlicht hat und weltweit Vorträge hält; er war jahrelang Präsident der International Association of Aesthetics und ist emeritierter Professor der Long Island University. Sein Aufsatz in dieser Polylog-Ausgabe nimmt zunächst seine Grundgedanken zur Ästhetik als Sinnlichkeitslehre wieder auf. Daraufhin gründet Berleant die »ästhetische Politik« auf der Idee eines »Gemeinguts der Wahrnehmung«, zu dem etwa Luft, Wasser oder Raum gehören; jeder Mensch hat Anspruch auf die (...) Wahrnehmung dieser natürlichen Ressourcen, die sauber bleiben sollen, um seiner Gesundheit und seinem Wohlbefinden zu dienen. Aus dieser Perspektive wird die »Kooptation der Sinnlichkeit«, anders gesagt: die kommerzielle und profitorientierte Aneignung dessen, was im öffentlichen Raum wahrzunehmen ist, scharf verurteilt. Die Ästhetik als Wahrnehmungslehre ist nicht von einer engagierten Ethik und demokratischen Politik des Gemeinwohls zu trennen. (shrink)

The revised edition of Subject to Ourselves, a lively and provocative book that was a leader on its topic in England, uses psychoanalytic theory as the basis for a fresh reassessment of the nature of modernity and postmodernism. Analyzing changing experiences of selfhood, desire, interpersonal relations, culture and globalization, the author develops a novel account of postmodernity that supplants current understandings of "fragmented selves." Subject to Ourselves includes a diverse set of case studies, including the power of fantasy in military (...) violence and war, the debate over sexual seduction in psychoanalysis, and the cultural uses of media and new information technologies. The book will be essential reading for students and professionals of social and political theory, psychoanalytic studies, psychology and cultural studies, as well as those with an interest in the modernity/postmodernity debate. Praise for the First Edition: 'This book not only fills an important gap in the literature, for it summarises a debate that is scattered across a decade of rather difficult texts, but also offers a resolution that is sensible and grounded in the best current thinking. It will be widely read by graduate students, faculty, and professionals in the humanities and social sciences.' Choice 'This is an informative and enjoyable book, which will be of use to students and academics...It is accessibly written and provides useful summaries of the different theories and debates in cultural and psychoanalytic theory. Recommended.' Radical Philosophy. (shrink)

Wir stimmen Dietmar Kamper zu, dass die einzigartige Artikulierung der Anthropo-Ethik des Ästhetischen zur Diagnose des heutigen Monströsen im Menschen zentral bleibt. Herders Prophezeiung wird damit vollzogen: „Wir glauben zu sehen, wo wir nur fühlen sollten; wir sehen endlich so viel und so schnell, daß wir nichts mehr fühlen, und fühlen können“. Dies geschieht durch die Übertragung der pragmatischen Epistemologie ins soziale Leben. Das soziale Leben im Zeitalter der totalen Experimentierung der Welt und des Menschen wird zu einem Laboratorium, und (...) ein blinder Konsens wird zur regulierenden Instanz des menschlichen Lebens. Die Berechtigung dieser Diagnose liegt in der Art und Weise, wie die heutige pragmatische Vernunft die Urteilskraft verdrängt. Ihres Erachtens dürfen wir zum einen das, was uns selbst betrifft, nicht als Ich-Person beurteilen, sondern nur im Namen der anderen, und zum anderen darf die Urteilskraft nur durch ein Unterwerfen unter die Ethik und die Rhetorik des Konsenses ersetzt werden. Covid ist eine Folge unseres blinden Hyper-Experimentalisierens der Welt, des Tierreichs und unserer selbst. Wir wissen heute, dass die sprachliche Einbildungskraft in der Tat erklärt, wie die Einbildungskraft das Sehen, die Kunst der Bilder sowie die Erfindung der wissenschaftlichen Hypothesen möglich macht: Sie gibt der visuellen und der wissenschaftlichen Einbildungskraft ihre Dialog- und Reharmonisierungskraft und fördert infolgedessen das Ausüben unserer Urteilskraft, damit sie die Objektivität ihrer Ergebnisse behaupten kann. Im Fall von Covid war es ebenso notwendig, die Urteilskraft zur Erstellung der Diagnose zu ergreifen, wie es stets nötig ist, die Objektivität einer medizinischen Lösung zu beurteilen und zu behaupten. (shrink)